Review essay

# The new translation of *Sein und Zeit*:
# A grammatological lexicographer's commentary

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Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit* (trans. Joan Stambaugh). A volume in the SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Dennis J. Schmidt, ed. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 487 + xx pp. $18.95 (cloth), $57.50 (paper).

After years of complaining about Macquarrie and Robinson's (= M&R) English translation of Heidegger's opus magnum, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), which we teachers of Heidegger have endeavored to explicate to our unteutonized students both graduate and undergraduate for over three decades, we now have a new English rendition of the German text from Joan Stambaugh, "one of Heidegger's students and leading interpreters, [who] takes account of English-language Heidegger research since the first translation of *Being and Time* in 1962." The publisher's flyer (from the book's back cover) continues and concludes:

> The Stambaugh translation captures the vital relation to language that animates Heidegger's original text. Through this translation elements of *Being and Time* that were not so clearly evident hitherto should become more apparent to readers of the English text. The new translation of key notions here should serve as the standard for Heidegger studies to come.

The all too brief "Translator's Preface," while praising M&R for being "at the forefront of bringing Heidegger's work into English" such that their translation "came to shape the way in which Heidegger's work was discussed in English," likewise observes that "the present translation attempts to take into account the insights of the past thirty years of Heidegger scholarship in English" (xiv). But it at once notes that the newly published translation "was begun some time ago," in point of fact before Heidegger's death in 1976, so that we have had Joan Stambaugh's translation of the two Introductions, as edited by David Krell, in the collection of *Basic Writings* since 1977.

Permission for it was granted by Heidegger himself along with the "express wish" that the now English word and central topic of the book "Da-sein," be hyphenated throughout the new translation. At the same time, he graciously gave the translator the handwritten poem on the grace of thought that now graces the front cover of this translation. The unteutonized reader, however, is left bereft of the benefit of a transcription of Heidegger's difficult "alte teusche" script, let alone a translation of the poem. The full translation of the book was completed in the late seventies and is thereby dated, having circulated in manuscript form for well over a decade. It therefore cannot claim to have taken the full measure of "the insights of the past thirty years of Heidegger scholarship in English," despite the valiant latter-day efforts of the SUNY editors to update it. The "new" translation of key notions, which in some cases are left unexplained and unjustified, leaving one with the impression of unilateral willfulness, should by and large *not* be made to "serve as the standard for Heidegger studies to come." Instead, the hope expressed in the Preface to "open a productive debate about some of the more original and still puzzling language of the text" should be given the freest play. This is a scholar's experiment in translation, and is thereby restricted in its scope for circulation among other interested scholars, not yet sufficiently polished and equipped for use in the undergraduate classroom. The translator's hope to "remedy some of the infelicities and errors of the previous translation" (xiv) is only occasionally and imperfectly met, in some cases in fact repeating its errors verbatim, indicating the degree to which the translator herself is obligated to the "first cut" made by M&R to decipher Heidegger's idiosyncratic syntax and style in rendering this ground-breaking book into English. Not that the new translation followed the old in any diligent and thoroughgoing fashion. Would that this were so. Repeated comparison of the two together, against the original Niemeyer edition,[1] is in fact one good way of uncovering the plethora of minor errors and omissions that have somehow been "left" in or "crept" into the new translation and, along the way, of acquiring a profound appreciation for the scholarly accuracy of M&R's rendition. Instead of complaining about it, we may well look back at M&R with nostalgia, and renewed gratitude.

   The opening pages show promise in the verve and simplicity of many of the sentences, raising the hope that this will be the more readable literary translation needed to offset the more literal and scholarly translation by M&R. M&R did their work in a "hermeneutic situation" in which SZ was widely regarded as "untranslatable." "We feel that this is an exaggeration," they remark tongue-in-cheek in their Preface of 1962. Nevertheless, this then prevalent attitude served to intimidate M&R into a careful attempt to convey as many of the nuances of the multivalent German text as possible into English, often

resulting in cumbersome and highly convoluted English sentences freighted with an excess of qualifying phrases and clauses. Their careful efforts toward nuanced accuracy are recorded in their many scholarly notes, reflecting their struggle to capture Heidegger's idiosyncratic usage often by verbatim citation of the entire German passage in question. This at least has prompted a whole generation of serious English students of BT to learn the German language in order to understand Heidegger better.

The new translation, by contrast, is notable for its paucity of Translator's Notes, even where clarification of the translator's terminological decisions would have been instructive to the untutored English reader. But the Translator's Preface from the start rightly notes the "strong connections" of Heidegger's German to everyday conversation and ordinary usage, apparently setting for itself the laudable norm of trying to capture these connections in equally ordinary English idiom. A glance at the German text reveals that, at least in the less methodological sections of the book, the vast majority of the sentences are structured simply and relatively straightforwardly. The only oddity, which made SZ difficult to read even for its first German readers, is the massive relocation of entire prepositional phrases, like being-in-the-world and being-with-one-another, into the position of common nouns, the proliferation of verbal nouns ranging from the infinitive "to be" and the gerundive "beings" to abstract coinages of nominalized verbs like *Befindlichkeit*, the state of finding oneself, and the related penchant for turning common adverbs like "really" (*eigentlich*) into abstract nouns. One soon learned that such "gramma(on)tological" shifts were part of a grand design to replace the traditional nominal ontology of substance and subject with a verbal ontology of time in its tenses and variable aspects (SZ 349), and in the linguistic frames of reference that "it" develops. But the opportunity to "capture the vital relation to language that animates Heidegger's original text" is time and again missed in this translation. We see this already in the early pages, which fail to note that such an overtly linguistic ontology of the verb dictates, e.g., that environmental habits of work more accurately develop under the jurisdiction of the *present* perfect apriori (SZ 85), and which fail to translate the difference between the *Zeitlichkeit des Daseins* and *Temporalität des Seins* that proliferates in the Second Introduction (SZ 19, 23–26, 38fn, 39–40, 147), not even by way of the capitalizing convention of "[T]emporality" adopted by M&R and Albert Hofstadter. *Temporalität*, with its allusion to the German word for grammatical tense(s) (*Tempus, Tempora*), refers accordingly to the "tensorality" of being. In the months prior to the development of the special categories called *Existenzialien* in the final drafting of SZ, Heidegger considered calling them "tensors" (*Temporalien*).

Time in its most proper sense, originative temporality, the time appropriate(d) to each of us, is identified from the start as the ultimate source of the "radical individuation" (SZ 38; now reinforced by the later marginal footnote) that Da-sein itself is, which is itself, in "formal indication," first introduced as "*in each instance mine*" (*je meines*: SZ 41, 114). "The being which is given over to us for analysis is in each instantiation we ourselves [*wir je selbst*]." There is a tendency even in M&R, who first called our attention to the pivotal centrality of this easy-to-ignore high-frequency German particle, *je* (in each particular case), and its adverbial variants, *jeweils* (each occasion, literally "each while") and *jeweilig* (at this particular time), to drop these particles in translation, usually to avoid further burdening already overloaded English sentences. Yet these particles are crucial in reminding us of the "occasional" or "indexical" nature of Da-sein, being here-now-I in this situational context, and therefore of the kind of categories its "existentials" are intended to be. They are intended to be distributive universals that vary essentially according to each individuating context, "je nach dem," and not generic universals that apply indifferently to *all*. On this "onto-logic" of universals so crucial to a "hermeneutics of facticity," Heidegger repeatedly acknowledges his debt to Aristotle (SZ 3, 14, 37fn), who first noted that "being is not a genus" and proceeded to explore the logic of variation of its analogical universality. This easily blurred distinction between the temporally particularizing universal (*jeweiliges Universal*) of the "each" that Dasein itself is and the indifferent generality of the "all" of the Anyone (Heidegger's most existentiell example will be Ivan Ilyitch's "all men are mortal": SZ 254 n. 12) is just another subtle but crucial "vital relation to language that animates Heidegger's original text" that is being lost by translating *je* typically as "always" and *jeweilig*, *jeweils* as "actual(ly)," the latter only vaguely recalling the individuating urgency intended by these words. The blurring of this distinction and of its individuating thrust is felt especially in the chapter that "attests" the fundamental authenticating action of being-here, that of "owning up" to one's own unique situation in its full propriety by way of the resolute response to the call of conscience (esp. SZ 276, 280, 284, 297–300). For the "call" does not exact an ideal and general task from a species-individual, but "the currently pressing individualized potential-to-be of the temporally particular human situation, being-here" (SZ 280).

The existentialistic tendency of this "new" translation would in fact have been further promoted not only by adopting the more verbally muscular and futuristically active "potential to be" for *Seinkönnen*, at least as a variant for the flat and philosophically stuffy "potentiality of being" but also an occasional use of "owned" and "disowned" in lieu of the jargonish "(in)authentic" for *(un)eigentlich*, all of which would have been very much in keeping with

the formally indicative methodology of SZ, designed in particular to develop the relational dynamics as well as an individuating vocabulary for the unique human situation of being-here. Leaving *Angst* in the German, even though "angst" has been in the English dictionaries since the sixties, only serves to call further attention to the existentialist ontics stressed by this translation. The translation of *Befindlichkeit* as "attunement" follows this ontic vein, and therefore conflates with *Gestimmtheit*, likewise the "attunement" originating from a mood (*Stimmung*). "Attunement" of course is superior to the psychologically tinged "state of mind," by far the worst blunder made in M&R's translation. Stambaugh rejects, likewise for its suggestion of psychological connotations (p. xv), Heidegger's Aristotelian understanding of *Befindlichkeit* as a translation of $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, "worldly disposition," which, "as the word suggests, must be a kind of position" (*Metaph*. 5.19.1022b2). *Befindlichkeit* fully translated refers to how one "finds oneself disposed," situated, positioned in and by the world. To mute its psychological connotations further, one need only to translate it with its all important "present perfect" suffix made fully explicit in the English, ergo as "disposedness," which brings it into close proximity with the equiprimordial "present perfect" states of disclosedness, discoveredness, thrownness, fallenness, and resoluteness, as Heidegger himself gradually begins to prefigure, in this careful choice of word-endings, the full panoply of his temporal ontology. In Heidegger's "formal indication" in first introducing the term, disposedness is the existential-ontological expression of the existentiell-ontic attunement of mood (SZ 134). Having a mood may be psychological, but being had by one's situation, being-put-upon by the world ("The world gets to me [*geht mich an*]": SZ 137–139), constantly being moved by the "happening" of life's contexts into "be-having" in one way or another, is its worldly and ontological counterpart. The middle-voiced reflexive verb, "finding oneself," is clearly being pushed formally to the outer limits of its receptive and passive passional past of already "having found oneself" and "having been found (out)," thrown, already acted upon, determined, disposed. Global *Sichbefinden* is regarded as the already intentionally structured, spatiotemporally schematized, holistic finding that "befalls" us, as opposed to the findings of *Empfinden*, "sensing" which in the Kantian framework is at first multiple, unstructured, chaotic, and random (SZ 137). This holistic fact of already being-in-the-world, as in a meaningful context, thus grounds the parallel distinction between facticity and factuality (SZ 135).

Early in his development, Heidegger "regionalized" the world into the *Selbstwelt*, *Mitwelt*, and *Umwelt*, and eventually assigned a kind of care proper to the human activity in each world, *Sorge* (care), *Fürsorge* (concern), and *Besorgen* (taking care). In departing from M&R's triad of care, solicitude, and concern that many had become comfortably used to, Joan Stambaugh

in fact also introduces (without commenting on it, p. xv) the first of several double translations that alternate between two verbally unrelated options for the same German word, in this case *Besorgen* as a "taking care" of things and as "heedfulness" (i.e. carefulness). The latter translation is introduced in part in order to "take care of" the high-frequency adjectival use of the term, such as in *besorgendes Aufgehen*, "heedful absorption" (SZ 72), *besorgender Umgang* "heedful association" (SZ 73, 79, 103, 352, 355, 357, 361), *besorgende Umsicht*, "heedful circumspection" (SZ 83, 111), and *besorgende Alltäglichkeit*, "heedful everydayness" (SZ 106). In addition to the confusion thereby created by all such disparately double translations, especially for the present TV generation's none too attentive crop of readers, one wonders why the more consistent adjective, "caretaking" or even "careful," would not have sufficed. The phrase "taking care of" in frequent gerundive-like clauses yields a plethora of inelegant cumbersome sentences (e.g., SZ 111). Even the economical German phrase "Im umweltlich Besorgten" becomes "In what is taken care of in the surrounding world" (S7 126), doubling the length of the English sentence. But if we adopt M&R's adjectival "environmental" for *umweltlich* along with their site for "concern," we get an economical sentence that is both idiomatic and to the point: "In environmental matters of concern, the others are encountered as what they are; they *are* what they do.": where the non-reifying "matters" quite accurately refers to chores and everyday affairs and not to "things at hand taken care of," an awkwardness at once inaccurate in its reification that occurs frequently in the new translation, at least in misleading nuance. In the many decisions involved in retranslating a great work, Heidegger's Swabian maxim of advice drawn from the idiom of habitual everyday concerns, "lassen es bewenden," suggests a pragmatic English equivalent: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."

But once one has taken this line of translating the terms of care, the newly fashionable gerund "caregiving" suggests itself as a more consequent translation for expressing the solicitude/concern for others, *Fürsorge*, and its distinction and connection to the other two kinds of caring. "Concern" likewise reappears in the translation of Heidegger's oft-repeated formal indication for the understanding-*of*-being that "Da-sein is a being which in its being 'is concerned *about*' [geht um = goes about] this very being" (SZ 12, *et passim*), a decided improvement over M&R's "is an issue for." But when the key phrase is alternately translated as "is concerned *with*" in certain contexts, it can be easily confused with the concern that accompanies being-with-others (e.g. SZ 123). In these same contexts, we also repeatedly encounter the untranslated German word, *Mitda-sein*, ugly even by German standards, retained in the English translation as a sort of English neologism. M&R translated it as

Dasein-with, and I would suggest "associate(d) Dasein," were it not for the following new confusion:

Regionalization is subtly transgressed with the translation of *Umgang*, which in BT refers strictly to the commerce of "getting around" with useful things in "getting about" their surrounding world (*Umwelt*, M&R's "environment"), as "association," in view of this word's misleading etymological reference to the social. Translated as "dealings" by M&R, *Um-gang* (going-around) is perhaps most etymologically translated as "intercourse," naturally suggesting (perhaps only to some) the wrong sort of intimacy in "being close to" (*Sein bei*) things. "Interaction" would probably be the most neutral way of expressing our active relations with things. Given the familiarly habitual "absorption" to which such busyness tends, I have translated such active relations with the less erotically intimate "(pre)occupation" with things, which is not too far off in view of the equation of *Umgang* with the Greek sense of *praxis*, "having to do with things [*pragmata*] SZ 68). The pragmatist Rorty has suggested "coping."

The pragmatic world of working with things brings us the distinction of two types of things, *Zuhandenes* and *Vorhandenes*, M&R's ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, in Stambaugh's translation, thing at hand and objectively present thing. Adding "objective" to the usual "presence" of *Vorhandenheit* is an overinterpretation, too narrow in view of the repeated reference of this term to the background presence of "nature" and to traditional ontological terms like reality, substance, subsistence, and subject, not to speak of the loss of the "hand" in the translation. But one needs some way of distinguishing this sort of presence from other sorts, like *Anwesenheit*, *Präsenz*, *Gegenwart*, etc. "Extant presence" is accurate, perhaps even pleonastic, if we can allow ourselves to speak of "extant*ly* present things."

*Zuhandenheit* is consistently translated as "handiness," but its "thing" is only "at hand" (*Zuhandenes*), thus presumably not yet "handy." The being of the handy (of something ready-to-hand [M&R] of things at hand [JS]), its ontological structure, said to lie between two other structures, that of reference and that of significance, is dramatically and elaborately identified by the highly idiomaticized German word from the Swabian dialect, *Bewandtnis* (involvement [M&R], relevance [JS], functionality [Hofstadter] appliance [TK]), perhaps the most difficult German term in SZ for the translator of any language. The French translations stress the sheer conjuncture of relations either in their fittingness or their "destination," i.e. the fulfilment of their purpose and coming to a closure. The modern Greek highlights simply their intertwining into a nexus, *sumplexis*.

*Bewandtnis* is a *category* that is located between reference and significance, but is closer to the references of the mediating "in order to," while

significance, the full meaningfulness of the totality called the world, comes only with the final closure of "for the sake of Da-sein," making the latter an existential rather than a category (SZ 84, 88). The references of "in order to" (listed *seriatim* on SZ 68, 83, 144) include manipulability (= handiness, *Handlichkeit*), conduciveness (e.g. the beneficial aids of accessories) detrimentality (preventive measures that ward off harmful effects like corrosion), serviceability (e.g., easily repaired), and usability. The last (*Verwendbarkeit* = applicability) is etymologically connected with *Bewandtnis* and *Bewenden*, whose older Swabian usages include "application" and "use" (*anwenden*). We therefore choose to translate *Bewandtnis* as "appliance," understanding it as the present perfect state of having-been-applied of an accustomed usage and practice, which continues to be applicable (effective) only if we repeatedly let it be normative and allow it to ply its course to term (*Bewendenlassen*). The translation "ap(t)pliance" is also intended to suggest, from its variant stem-senses, some of the other kinds of reference of "in order to" that it includes: pliancy (workability, adaptability, suppliance), compliance (fittingness, suitability), impliance or implication (more of a hermeneutical connective than M&R's "involvement"). Between generic reference and significance there is appliance, the being of the handy and the ontological structure of the surrounding world in which we get around with the handy and with which we are preoccupied. But the test of any translation of this term is its illuminating fit into the particular prepositional nexus that it is supposed to interconnect and weave into a world. Three slightly different prepositional idioms are intercalated here: the generic reference 1) *of* something *to* something (SZ 68), say, *of* a hammer *to* hammering becomes, in Heidegger's oft repeated idiomatic expression, "*Mit* etwas hat es seine Bewandtnis *beim* etwas" (SZ 84), 2) "There is *with* this hammer its appliance *to* [or implication *in*] hammering." That is to say, an intimate habitual "with" explicates its implication expressly *to* hammer *in* hammering likewise understood in the familiar prepositions of habitual human agency. In the closely related third prepositional nexus of strict "in order to," in which we say that the handy hammer is 3) *for* hammering it is clear that "the to-what [nexus 2 above] of appliance is [correlative to] the for-what [nexus 3] of serviceability, the wherefore of usability" (SZ 84). Accordingly, a whole referential chain of the noetic "with . . . in, to" (nexus of intimately habitual human apply*ing*), or the noematic "in-order-to . . . for" (nexus of appl*ied* tool handiness), where the same action within the series turns from being the *to* of an inter-mediate end "into" the following *with* of means, can now come to its terminating end of closure:

> The for-what of serviceability can in turn have its appliance. For example, *with* this handy thing which we accordingly call a hammer, there is its impliance *in* hammering *with* hammering there is its impliance *in* nailing

fast, and *with* this fastening together its appliance *to* protection against bad weather; this protection "is" for-the-sake-of providing shelter to Da-sein. . . . The implicative totality of appliance itself [thus] ultimately leads back to a for-what which *no longer* has an appliance, which itself is not a being with the kind of being proper to something handy within a world. It is rather a being whose being is defined as being-*in*-the-world, to whose constitution worldliness itself belongs. The primary for-what is not just one more "*for* that" as a possible *to*-what of another appliance. The primary "for-what" is a for-the-sake-of-which. But the "for-the-sake-of-which" always refers to the being of *Da-sein* which in its being goes *about* this being itself. (SZ 84)

I have translated this crucial passage from §18 on "Appliance and Significance" at length, in part to illustrate the care that must be taken in translating the defining complex of prepositions which set the tone that pervades each frame of reference, which is not sustained with any kind of consistency and clarity in the Stambaugh translation (SZ 84–87, 353f, *et passim*). But, more importantly, this phenomenological description of human actions in their orienting frames of reference has just made its crucial (Aristotelian) distinction between two radically different types of action and frames of reference, 1) the instrumental action of appliance referring externally to things of use, and 2) the *self*-referential action for the sake of its own being of properly human being that is the ultimate ground, reason, or "significance" of instrumental reference. This properly human frame of self-reference, the self-world (worldliness as such), grounds and anchors the surrounding world of getting around and getting by with things. With the emergence of this basic distinction in frames of reference, one begins to see the inadequacy of the translation of *Bewandtnis* with the overly generic "relevance," a word that is equally synonymous with "significance" as well as with "applicability," and is not all that distinct from the generic term "reference." The blurring of the crucial distinction in reference by such a generic translation is most evident in statements like the following: "The referential connection of significance is anchored in the being of Da-sein toward its ownmost being – a being with which there essentially cannot be a relation of relevance [appliance, functionality] – but which is rather the being *for the sake of which* Da-sein itself is as it is" (SZ 123). Its own being clearly is of acute relevance to an intrinsically self-referential being which "in its being goes about [*geht um* = is concerned with] this very being" (Heidegger's repeated formal formula for the understanding-of-being that Da-sein itself is: SZ 12, 42, 52, 84, *et passim*). But this very same being (*Sein*) cannot itself directly assume the character of appliance referring to things in such a way that would disengage and put out of play the self-reference that it essentially is, a self-reference which in fact

is the very basis for encountering beings of the character of appliance at all.
"Da-sein in each instance always already *refers itself* from and by way of a
for-the-sake-of-which to the with which of an appliance" (SZ 86). To put it
another way: appli*ance* is the middle ground of instrumental intentionality,
the present-perfect milieu of us*ance* where the noematic appli*ed* and noetic
apply*ing* meet, and only the latter properly refers back to the self-reference
of significance.

This self-referential understanding introduces the most central noun-pre-
positional phrase of SZ, *das Woraufhin*, the very sense or meaning of Da-sein,
destined to find its place at the very root of originative temporality. JS by and
large adopts, though not without inconsistency (SZ 85f = for which), the
M&R translation of this key phrase, "the upon-which." But such a translation
is only half-right, in view of the essentially "circular" and initially teleological
character of the self-referential and double-genitive understanding-*of*-being
whose pre-suppositional fore-structure is at once before and forward, already
and ahead. The full, temporally "circular" translation would therefore be (in
a crucial sentence first introducing the hermeneutic circle) that "sense" (more
directional than "meaning") "is the *toward-which* of the projection structured
by prepossession, preview, and preconception, *according-to-which* some-
thing becomes understandable as something" (SZ 151). One does not need,
of course, to cite the full circularity of *das Woraufhin*, "the toward-which-
according-to-which," in every context. The "upon-which" or "according-to-
which" would suffice in less futuristic contexts where the present perfect
suffixes of world*liness* in its meaning*fulness* (= significance) prevail, as well
as in the habitual referential contexts of appli*ance* and their ultimate sig-
nific*ance*. But one should at least on occasion be reminded of the full and
"comprehensive" temporality of sense incorporated in *das Woraufhin*.

With this dimactic prepositional phrase at the heart of the movement of
the meaning of Da-sein, one hopefully begins to sense the importance of
trying to get the vectorial (spatiotemporal) sense of ordinary prepositional
phrases as right as possible, which as the most idiomatic "parts of speech" in
any language (some, like Hungarian, only have postpositions) are most resis-
tant to facile one-to-one translation. One must nevertheless strive to translate
each distinctive prepositional constellation into one's own idiom in a way
that would capture its specific tonality (e.g. the intimacy of *bei*) and max-
imize its prefiguration of the sense-structures of reference, those of space
as well as of time. As Heidegger explicitly notes (SZ 112), the usance of
appliance/functionality first defines the lived spatiality of the "around" (*das
Um*) of the handy within the surrounding world (*Umwelt*) in which we get
around (*umhergehen*) and make our rounds (*herumgehen*) in a daily circula-
tion "in order to" (*um-zu*) carry out our habitual chores. JS's "together with"

for "*Sein-bei*-innerworldly beings" at the very heart of care's structure is an improvement over M&R's "alongside," but "among, amidst," or best of all "close to," would have better conveyed the note of intimate familiarity contained in *bei*. After all, handiness is first of all the *quality* of the *ready* to hand; it refers to something near at hand proliferating around us, *accessible* to the hand at its convenience, optimally in the right place as well as at the right time. In the end, the "substantial being" of the things in place is being "volatized" (SZ 87,117), they "evaporate" into a subtle spatiotemporal constellation of active habitual relations *and* the overall tonality of the actions within it. *Bewandtnis* is a term that suggests two interrelated insubstantial ontological traits, one structural and the other elemental in nature: 1) a conjuncture of available relations, the operative "means" (*Verhältnisse*) that provision a working milieu, its specifiable working conditions, the "lay" (*Lage*, *Gelegenheit*) of a particular "land," place, or situation; 2) the imponderable atmosphere that pervades such a state of affairs, the aura radiated by the milieu, the "air" about it, its felt quality, the mood of a relationship or an environment.[2] The conservative sense of comfort in the intimately familiar and the feeling of ease and convenience of already extant conventions are the overtones suggesting themselves in the German idiom of acceptance of the status quo often repeated by Heidegger in this context, "lassen es bewenden: let the implications [of familiar appliance] apply," let the accustomed practice continue. "Letting something (things) be relevant, in relevance" (SZ 84–87, 110f, 353–356) is wrong also for its appearance of reinstating the substantial "things," that can and should be left "volatized" in this reference to the pure network of applicable references, to the background hermeneutic context of the "referential (appliant) totality of implications."

Thus, *Bewandtnis* is at once an order concept and a style concept, depicting the overall style or tenor of a set of actions in a practical setting that necessarily shapes the practice. It is an active practical counterpart for the environing world to the more receptive *Befindlichkeit* structuring the self-world, the disposedness to the world ordered by the moods that it elicits. It is also the very first of a line of concepts that the later Heidegger will gather under the pre-Socratic Greek rubric of *ethos*, which is first the spirit that haunts a dwelling, its *genius loci*, then the transmitted custom, practice, usage that structures our current dwelling; in short, the habit of a habitat, *how* it is inhabited. The tenor of usage in the "homey" Swabian workplace conveyed by its nexus of "appliance" ("relevance" is too generically neutral to suggest a style or mood, but "functionality" has American pragmatic possibilities) will have to be compared with the style and working conditions that Heidegger discovers in the essence of modern technology, which he characterizes with the deliberately artificial word, *Ge-Stell*, the artefactic compositing of

planetary resources that repositions the world into a global warehouse to hold its "natural" resources in standing reserve. The atmosphere of efficiency and efficacy pervading a workplace furnished with a planetary reserve instead of a simpler and more local ready-to-hand, how its furnishings are tuned and geared up ("treated") to prepare them for the work they are to perform in each context, how workers are outfitted and trained for their "craft" or function, take on a distinctly different tenor and ethos in the two extremes of a medieval workshop/farmstead ensconced in the domesticity of guild custom and a modern laboratory in its innovative experimentation, each creating its own unique working "environ-ment" and "atmo-sphere."

Recognizing the signal importance of the "ethical" tonality of its most basic structural terms forces the knowledgeable translator of SZ to take far more care in choosing just the right constellation of words from one's native idiom in its current usage in order, within such groupings of terms, to convey a more consistent and nuanced balance in their ineluctable overtones, especially between the two extremes of generic neutrality and overly specific ontic connotations. Heidegger himself testifies to the inescapable ontic roots of his formal ontology of the protopractical human situation (SZ 310) while at the same time seeking to establish just the right balance between the formal and the concrete in the indexical universals that articulate our being-here-now-we at its most rudimentary level of being. How well he succeeds poses perhaps its greatest challenge for the translator to bring out, especially in the one arena that he does not develop to its full formality in BT, the ethos of social custom and cultural praxis to be found at the primal ontological level of simply being-with-one-another in the with-world. The closest he comes to articulating the *quality* of this relationship equiprimordial with the anxious aura of normative (= authentic) praxis in the self-world (Division Two on resolute responsiveness to the deep demands evoked by my unique situation) and the efficient aura of the surrounding world (Division One on letting the implications of already familiar appliance apply) is his all-too-brief development of the two extremes of being-for-the-other. One is immediately struck (at least it struck M&R, if not JS) by the curious mix of pedagogical and political nuances in the terms chosen to express these formal extremes. In pages marred by a number of minor translation errors (SZ 121–123/JS Engl. 114–116: there are unfortunately more than a few such pages in this translation),[3] we read first of all that the "care for" others which in the public domain has come to be institutionalized as social "welfare" (*Fürsorge*, also "concern/solicitude") organizations is to be traced back ontologically to Da-sein as being-with, which "is" essentially "for the sake of others." At this ontological level, the two extreme positive possibilities of being-for and caring-for the other suggest themselves: 1) to "leap in" for the other and take

over his proper responsibility in providing for his own cares and, by thus making him dependent on such welfare, come to dominate (*beherrschen* = rule and control) the other; 2) to "leap ahead" of the other "in her existentiell potential-to-be" (omitted in the translation, p. 115) in order to help the other to become transparent to herself *in* her own care and free *for* it. Bringing the other to her own potential is accordingly a movement of liberation (*Befreiung*). This process is later described as one of "becoming the conscience of others" (SZ 298), whose ontic manifestation could include not only friends and personal mentors but also statesmen-orators (as we know from other texts). This authentic being-with-one-another can never arise "from the ambiguous and jealous conspiracies and the garrulous factions of clans in the they" (SZ 298, politicized translation). The generic state of "the they," its antics in its domain of "publicity," constitutes the ground category of Heidegger's "political ontology," as Pierre Bourdieu pointed out long before Heidegger's texts glossing Aristotle's *Rhetoric* surfaced to confirm the thesis.

In both passages, JS replaces the pedagogical-political tonality of "liberation" (first from the state of "the they") with the more generically imprecise "freeing." But she reinstates this tonality to some extent with an interesting translation of one of the discretionary sights of concern/solicitude for the other, comparable to the circumspection needed in the provision of things, as "tolerance (*Nachsicht* = indulgence, forbearance, patience, leniency; all in the sense of "overlooking" shortcomings and differences). The other discrete interpersonal sight is "considerateness" (*Rücksicht*), where a "regard" for the other would have been more idiomatic as well as etymologically accurate. The importance of this constellation of sights (especially the perspicuity of "transparency" [*Durchsichtigkeit*] that authenticates the self) to the overall conceptual structure of SZ might also be briefly indicated here, inasmuch as all of them find their orderly grounding in an "understanding" which is temporally more basic than any "intuition," and this understanding is made possible by the "lighting/clearing" of a sense of being that is through and through temporal. Following this visual trail to the most central terms (and related terms like "horizon": see the Lexicon to the new translation) of BT serves to "illuminate" the early Heidegger's only partly successful struggle to get over the all-pervasive visual language of eternal *Lichtmetaphysik* and re-place it in the more dynamic and relational vocabulary required to describe, not the "vision," but the essentially destabilizing non-static "action" of being. Even the metaphorical usage of seemingly incidental visual relations like "in regard to" and "in view of" get caught up in this struggle to transform our deeply "intuitive" habits of language, with ambiguous results (see Considerateness, etc. in the Lexicon). The added ambiguity of inconsistent and excessively

"sliding" translation only further obscures this core struggle that is traced in the linguistic interstices of BT.

A final double translation ought to be mentioned. Rather than M&R's fallenness, *Verfallen* is translated alternatively as "entanglement" or "falling prey," and very succinctly described by the translator's footnote as a kind of "movement" that does not get anywhere (133 n. 3, p. 403). Having "entangled" and "entangling" available as adjectives avoids the complexifying addition of inelegantly awkward, lengthy adjectival phrases that we get with "taking care of" (*besorgendes*). Only a slight confusion arises when one of the specific components of entanglement (*Verfallenheit*) is also an "entanglement" (*Verfängnis*), along with the specific "movements" of alienation, temptation, and tranquillization within the overall inertia of "falling prey." It remains for the thoughtful reader to decide how well all of these terms "hang together" in conveying the "resistance to change" and current "drag" upon the basically forward thrust of the "thrown project" of Da-sein that fallenness/entanglement is. The vectorial thrust of time's transcendence and counterthrust of its decadence and degeneration are also the ultimate basis for the existential polar opposites that structure the self in BT: my-self and they-self, authentic and inauthentic, originative temporality and everydayness.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to an occidental language heavily freighted with a Parmenidean metaphysics of identity and static presence is posed by the penultimate chapter of BT entitled "Temporality and Historicity." As a kind of summation of all that has gone before, this chapter attempts to understand the entire complex of movements that now "prefigure" Da-sein (by way of a loosely coordinated list of equiprimordial existentials or "tensors") in its tensed unity and continuity. Even his verbally slanted German idiom, Heidegger concludes, is woefully inadequate to illuminate "the ontological enigma of the movement of the Happening [*Geschehen*, occurrence (JS), historizing (M&R)]" of Da-sein (SZ 389). The classical problem of "being and movement," now thoroughly temporalized, continues to be "haunted" by "enigma" (SZ 391). How is one to render transparent "the continuity [*Zusammenhang* "connection" or "connectedness" for both M&R and JS] of life between birth and death" (SZ 373)? Where and how to site this "Between," in its narrow everyday reckoning as well as in the authenticating move that overtly takes both "ends" of life into its account? The "tensed stretch [*Erstreckung*] Between" that Da-sein *is* (SZ 374) can in English, according to the context, "happily" be activated from a fallow "span" of time into the full "tension" of time's "tenses" that conative care connotes. Unhappily for JS, however, the unifying "current" of "occurrence" cannot be sustained to keep it current to the point of suggesting the single continuity of unique Da-sein. "Occurrence" continually lapses into its connotations of an instantaneous event that multi-

plies into a series or loose succession of experiences. Da-sein as such seems to "occur" successively, but it happily "happens" in a sustained current, "comes to pass" in a quasi-biblical, momentous but not momentary Happen*ing* that already prefigures Heidegger's first and last word for Being as Time, the properizing Event of the *singulare tantum*, *das Er-eignis*. Da-sein happens to us, putting us "datively," as "always already" *given*, on the recei*ving* end of its ongoing Happen*ing*, in a position of response to the demands that it "puts upon" us. M&R's "historizing" for *Geschehen* brings out this sustained dynamics accurately enough, albeit awkwardly, but loses the "thrown" tonality of this Happening. The ordinary English "happening" applied to history as such, and properly radicalized for the reader in a translator's footnote or two, would have served to subject the body language of the reader to this ongoing "undergoing" of *Erfahrung* (and its *Gefahr*, the perils of ex*peri*ence) much more directly and intuitively. The laudable goal set by Joan Stambaugh to give us, wherever possible, a simple and readable translation of the sentences of BT must, in these last chapters, look for its insights to the full amplitude of resources secreted in the English language, from the deep vectorial structure of its grammatology and etymology back to the everyday surface structure of its ordinary but often illuminating idioms and "proverbs" on time, life, and history, matching Heidegger's similar efforts in the German language. The multivalent German noun *Zusammenhang* (from the verb for "hanging together"), so central to a hermeneutic ontology of life since Dilthey, must in these contexts be translated in sliding and yet intuitively interconnected ways across its middle-voice, ranging from the seemingly static connexus of holistic "context" and "(cor)relation" to the sustained dynamics of "continuity" of tradition and "contextualizing" of world horizons ("It's worlding' ") – not to speak of the challenge exacted by this incessant motion to restore the "coherence" of historical life. In sum, the "play" on the German should, wherever possible, be matched by the vehicles of "play" and "ploys" offered by the host language, within bounds, of course, without a maudlin breach of the current rules of tact set by the customs of allowable usage, without overoffensive violation of the hospitality offered by the host "ethos."

For SZ itself from the start openly exceeded the then acceptable usage of the German language in the philosophical circles at the time of its writing. But not primarily in the metaphorical play on German etymology, as some English imitations of Heidegger's style have led us to believe. For example, the play on *Ur-sprung* (a hyphenation unfortunately not noted in the translation of the marginal comment on SZ 271fn), origin as "primal leap," is an early borrowing from the neo-Kantian Paul Natorp. An indispensable preparation for the translator of SZ is a thorough understanding of the peculiar hermeneutic (phenomenological) logic of concept formation that Heideg-

ger devised for developing his framework of existentials in SZ, which he called "formal indication" (*formale Anzeige*. Mentioned only a half-dozen times in SZ, the very phrase and its equivalents, like "precursory indication," was usually translated out and disseminated into the interstices of BT by M&R. And JS does not always get it right: on SZ 53 it becomes a "calling attention to [*angezeigt*] the formal concept of existence." Heidegger himself does not explicitly announce the subtle movement of intentionality succinctly conveyed by the etymology of formally indicative "ex-sistence," and how it serves to develop the ek-static (i.e. non-static) dynamics of temporality, until after the drafting of SZ. Nor does he note the analogous intentionality incorporated in the more latent formal indications of "(having) to be" in the background of SZ and that of "transcendence," which is to guide the histori-cal destructuring of inherited transcendental philosophy. Knowing this would have made, for example, the more muscularly verbal "potential-to-be" a self-evident and necessary translation of *Seinkönnen* and would have illumined the occasional reference to a "way to be" (*Weise zu sein*, sometimes rendered static as "way of being") as an alternative way of identifying the existential "category." A greater sense of the indexical intent of the indication, serving to point to the ineluctably temporalized individuation of being-here-now-I, would have prompted the translators to devise various linguistic strategies to nuance their sentences toward this *je-weiliges je-meiniges* character of Da-sein, as Heidegger himself does, "je nach dem." The subtle rhythms of steady steadfast persistence and interruptive crisis, the in-constant relapses from the constant stance of "existing" (*Existieren*, also often rendered static in translation), the statics and ecstatics repeatedly thrust toward the outermost extremities of ex-sistence, would have been conveyed in translation as fully and as consistently structured as they are vectorially interconnected in the new language game systematically generated in the German text. In short, the new and different attitude toward linguistic usage promoted methodologically by the formal indication of temporally contextualized and individuated inten-tionality would have sensitized translators to find roughly equivalent vectorial structures and dynamic schematisms latent in the "genius" of their respective host languages, as Heidegger tries to bring out in the gramma(on)tology of his native German and, lately, Derrida in his native French.

This latter development is already "infecting" the "textuality" of our new translation in Krell's edition of the two Introductions in 1977, which also supplies the "exergue" (so in JS, p. vii) from Plato's *Sophist* that prefaces the entire text of SZ. One discovers, for example, a deconstructionist "twist" in the rendering, more often that not, of that mode of concealment that Hei-degger calls *Verstellung*, strictly and properly the dissemblance of "disguise," into the more motile dissemination of "distortion," a metonymic crossing

of metaphors more dispersive than that of *Lichtung* as "lighting/clearing." "Disguise" is more in keeping with the overall metaphorological drift of the vocabulary of truth/untruth as un-covering and unveiling, un-concealing, dis-closing and closing off. Even the less erratic hiding that shelters, the *Bergen* of the later Heidegger, is already alluded to in SZ in the form of the preserve of truth through *Verwahrung*. But M&R already unwittingly launched the most comprehensive deconstructionist twist of all, which mutes the essential genealogical proclivities of SZ by their translation of *ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit* as "primordial temporality," which JS continues, rather than "originative temporality" understood as the ultimate meaning and ground of Da-sein, its transcendental a priori condition of possibility and the ultimate horizon of its being all of which promise to give a unifying and unique new name to the disseminative temporal scatter of a multiplicity of "equiprimordial" existentials. The derivative forms of temporality in their deficient or privative modes do not "originate," but instead "arise" (*entspringen*) from the temporalizing of ecstatic temporality. Nevertheless, any "arising" is but a degeneration from a single spring, source, or origin so rich that the multiplicity of phenomena that it generates is but one more mark of the "inexhaustible" wealth of ways needed to "articulate" that origin (SZ 334).

Granting a measure of disseminative play in no way warrants the confusion of tongues, inflation of language, and excess of translatory variance that prevents the maintenance of some measure of consistency in vocabulary and style throughout the translated text, and that interrupts the thoroughgoing sustenance of the simplicity and literary economy found on many of the pages of the new translation of BT. Henry Aiken's impression upon reading the first English translation of BT, "it's like swimming through wet sand," recurs anew for new reasons even for the experienced reader familiar with the German original. The translation, which laid dormant for years as a raw manuscript available upon request from the translator, was then rushed into print at the last minute under the pressure of legal limitations. It comes to us in a printed state of disrepair, still rife with the plethora of minor errors and omissions that marred the manuscript, along with a pattern of excessively variant and unnecessarily deviant translation of its basic and middle-level terms, and finally the discrepancies that resulted from an incomplete follow-through on changes in translation of key terms made in the last stages. Even the otherwise excellent and indispensable Index to the new translation, called a "Lexicon" because of the current politics surrounding editions and translations of Heidegger's works, suffers from some of the same flaws for the same reasons. The Glossary of German terms with their English equivalents, still too incomplete in the last stages of proofreading, was deleted at the last minute. The printed text needs a thorough "shakedown" to clear it of

its multifarious flaws of commission and omission, perhaps a good job for an advanced graduate class of diligent Germanists and philosophers, or by a summer institute of Heidegger scholars. The two extant translations compared against the German original might in this way be "aufgehoben" into a third more literate as well as accurate English rendition of *Being and Time* "ready to hand" in the college classroom for a new generation of students. The situation is not unlike Heidegger scholarship in Japan where, I've been told, there have been a dozen or so translations of SZ over the last seven decades, some in a worse state of disrepair than the present one.

The most unique feature of the new translation is the inclusion of Heidegger's later marginal comments in his "cabin copy" of SZ, jotted down by and large in the thirties around the time of the composition of the *Beiträge*, as footnotes to the corpus of the present text. M&R, on the other hand, made a point of restoring the footnotes (now endnotes) dropped from the first edition of 1927, or modified, with the resetting and slight retouching of the seventh edition of 1953, namely, those footnotes that specifically refer to the projected but never published Divisions of BT, making it the most notorious fragment in 20th century philosophy. These offsetting features alone warrant the continued study of the two translations together, in order thereby to come to understand the interrelation between the Rise and Fall of the full project of SZ, followed by its ongoing deconstruction and attempted displacement by later texts like the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*.

## Appendix: A last look from the rear

A few final words are in order concerning the uniquely revelatory aspects of the Lexicon/Index that brings up the rear of the new translation. Heidegger's peculiar genius in the usage of the German language for philosophical purposes (in contrast e.g. to Hegel's) is not merely in the plying of its etymological "roots," as some imitators in stereotypical parody have taken it to be, but also in the intensely verbal orientation even of its non-verbal words (a central tendency even in ordinary German), exploitation of the idioms familiar to him from his allemannian-swabian home-dialect, and the counter-traditional grammatical shifts (e.g. toward the impersonal indexical sentence, double genitive constructions and other middle-voiced equivalents like the "reflexive"). Following the overriding tendency in M&R to index philosophically significant ordinary expressions like "give to understand" and "have to be," the new Lexicon adds some new common expressions like "way to be" (*Weise zu sein*, an alternative formal indication of an "existential" category), "way" (*Weg*) and "underway" (*unterwegs*), the latter being ordinary ways of alluding to the etymology of method as "meta hodos." The unique forté of the Lexicon over M&R is the display of the full panoply of the traditional philosophical and technical terms connecting the intercalated methods that govern the concept formation of the *existentials* (e.g, distantiality, de-distancing, nearness, making room) of the analytic of Dasein in their distinction from the newly coined *categories* of the handy (respectively, distance, remoteness, farness, region).

The heavily Kantian infrastructure of the *transcendental method* is reflected not only in the traditional terminology of transcendence and a priori, but also that of constitution, ground, and "condition of possibility" (which JS restores after M&R tended to disperse this Kantian formula). Such terminology fuses into the *phenomenological method*, which adds the multivalent central term "horizon" (indexed in its full complexity) and the intentional schemata that it "prefigures" or "prescribes," which are accordingly the matters for "demonstration," "description," and "exhibition," or made subject to the "violence" of "destructuring" that precedes the transcendental reconstruction of essence (for Heidegger equivalent to existence), by way of a holistic "analytic" of identifiable existential wholes into their "moments" or parts. Grounding and founding develop into a complex schematism of modifications, deriving from the original mode, of deficient, negative, and indifferent modes, which are to receive their ultimate founding in the dynamically dispersed "ground" of ecstatic-horizonal temporality. The "primordiality" and "equiprimordiality" of this unique experiential dimension generate a lavish genealogical vocabulary of "temporalizing, arising, coming to be, provenance" from the "origin," which already in BT is sometimes expressed poetically as the "leaping" from a "source" or "wellspring." These characters all find their way into the especially pervasive *hermeneutic method* of interpretation, "reading off," and exposition of the initially tacit presuppositional structures of a prior understanding of what it means to be. The hermeneutic circle dictates the added complexity of application not only directly to the phenomena of Da-sein but also repeatedly to the book itself in a grand cycle of retrieval of the "equiprimordial" whole/part structures explicated in the First Division, to be retaken against the background unity and articulation of ecstatic-horizonal temporality after it is "cleared" in the climactic §65 of the Second Division. Therefore, despite the intrinsic proclivity toward simple and ordinary language, however unusual and tortuous its grammatical shifts may at first seem, the technical terms of the intertwined philosophical methods complicate the task of the translator of BT exponentially. A careful index sorting out this complex of methodological terms could only aid and abet that task of both the translator and her readers.

The identification and sorting out of the existentials from the categories, the tracking of the implicit etymology of the formal indication of "ek-sistence" already operative in BT in forming the existential concepts that are to sustain an "ecstatic" temporality (in terms like exist*ing*, con-stancy, and out-standing), noting the incipient grammatolological shift in linguistic function toward the non-apophantic, indexical, exclamatory "assertion" of impersonal Being in forms like *Es gibt* (There is/It gives) and the self-referential formal indication of being's understanding "It is concerned in its being about this being": these are but some of the tasks that await the lexicographer of the complex of terms called BT. The most overtly central language games include the elaborate vocabulary of truth's unconcealing and the more temporal vocabulary of possibility and its freedom of "leeway" and "letting" that prompts Heidegger to promise a new counter-traditional "modal logic" of being. The very notion of "logic" thus assumes a new dimension within a fundamental ontology, as do the traditional disciplines of "ethics" and "physics." BT has assumed a life of its own in spawning new directions in a variety of traditional disciplines like psychology and theology. The tracks of other regional disciplines still left fallow should accordingly also be lexically located in the text for future cultivation, e.g., those of economics, genealogy, geography, linguistics, literature, physiology, politics/rhetoric, technology.

More to the points at issue here, the Lexicon, indexed first of all to the German word, allows the careful reader to decide for herself if the slippage in translation that frequents the new English rendition disrupts the nuanced sense of the text to the point of obfuscation and missed communication. Examples of such constellations abound, but one will have to suffice by way of a parting shot: The middle-level terms that amplify and mediate the central vector of the fundamental "always already" movement of Da-sein, thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), include abandonment (*Überlassenheit*, also "being left"), delivered over (*überantwortet*, also "entrusted"), submission to (*Angewiesenheit auf*, also "dependence/reliance on" the world), and surrender (*sich ausliefern*). In addition to the doubled translations just noted, crossovers among these four not quite synonymous terms abound, in a translator's freedom only occasionally checked by care or tact. Thus, *überlassen* at times becomes "delivered over" (SZ 365, 412f), *ausgeliefert* turns into "subject to" (SZ 412), *angewiesen* entails "being referred [instead of "relegated" or "consigned"] to a here" (SZ 417). The latter choices in particular mute the felt sense of "thrownness" and "abandon" (Sartre's *dereliction*) in its full fatality that one would want to bring out in its various tonalities in this vectorial arena, "je nach dem," according to the context. Translating Heidegger at this level with some measure of high resonance and fine tuning is not an easy task . . . nor is indexing a translator of Heidegger.

## Notes

1. The new translation is presumptively based on the reset and slightly retouched 7th (1953) and subsequent editions: Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, [7]1953, [16]1986), pp. XII + 437; hereafter referred to as SZ. Fortunately for the bilingual reader, the pagination (1–437) of this edition is to be found in the margins of both English translations of *Being and Time* (= BT). The new translation, which footnotes Heidegger's later marginal comments to his "cabin copy," at times follows Klostermann's *Gesamtausgabe* edition of SZ, where these marginalia likewise appear as footnotes . . . which accounts for several of the varia to be found in the body of the new translation; e.g., JS's p. 275, 1. 2 translates (without the warning of a footnote) *entschliesst* (Klostermann) instead of *erschliesst* (Niemeyer). The Niemeyer editions since [14]1977 list the later marginalia in an appendix, pp. 439–445.

2. The word associations of the first group under *Bewandtnis* relate structure with spatiotemporal site: "Gelegenheit – Konjunktur – Konstellation – Lage – Ort – Phase – Sachlage – Sachverhalt – Situation – Stadium – Stand – Stellung – Stufe – Tatbestand – Zeit – Zustand – Verhältnisse – Verumständung." The second grouping suggests a more elemental milieu: "Atmosphare – Aura – Bedingung – Begleitumstände – Bewandtnis – das Drum und Dran – Fluidum – Gefühlston – Imponderabilien – Milieu – die Luft um die Dinge – die Unwägbarkeiten – Gefühlswerte – Stimmung." Finally, some ordinary idioms that point to conditions thus qualified or *bewandt*: "was los ist – woran man ist – es steht (liegt) so, das." Franz Dornseiff, *Der Deutsche Wortschatz nach Sachgruppen* (Berlin: de Gruyter, [5]1959), p. 196.

   Note also in this connection the particular aptness of translating *Umwelt* as "environment," which in the English idiom can be cozy or hostile, friendly or unfriendly, comfortable or threatening etc.

3. A listing of the prolific errors would take too much space here. But the careful reader should be wary especially of the following (E/G) pages: xiv (1.8 omits "scholars,"), 53/57, 80f/86f, 115f/122f, 179/192, 274/297f, 349/388, 350/382, 353/386, 378f/412.