

Review essay

**“Let a hundred translations bloom!” A modest proposal about
Being and Time ***

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Speak in German – some of these
people may understand English.
Mark Twain, Dec. 1, 1878

Let a hundred flowers bloom,
let a hundred schools of thought contend!
Mao Zedong, May 2, 1956¹

In the first place, congratulations to Prof. Joan Stambaugh of Hunter College for the years of arduous work that have now borne fruit in her *Being and Time*. This noteworthy achievement is every bit at the level of her previous translations of Heidegger, and readers familiar with those will find the present volume a condign culmination to her earlier efforts.

Many of us first met this translation some twenty years ago in its then typed format – 690 double-space pages replete with hundreds of handwritten corrections. Now two decades later, a glance at that earlier manuscript reveals that little has changed in the intervening years: The published book is virtually identical to the earliest typed manuscript. So too, the Introduction here (JS 1–35) is the same one that appeared in *Basic Writings* (1977, 41–89) with only minor changes.

One accomplishment of this book is that, with a few exceptions, it manages to include all the German sentences. Unremarkable as that might sound, it is not the case with some other translations of Heidegger. *What is Called Thinking* omits whole swaths of the German original, six and nine sentences

* Abbreviations in this article: SZ = the various Niemeyer editions of *Sein und Zeit*. GA = Klostermann’s *Gesamtausgabe* edition (1977). MR = the Macquarrie-Robinson translation (1962). JS = Prof. Joan Stambaugh’s translation (1996). I refer to these texts by page and line. The line count does not include the “header” or empty lines but does include section titles.

at a shot, including entire paragraphs, one of which makes an indirect (perhaps uncomfortable?) reference to World War Two.² Whole sentences have also been dropped from *On Time and Being, Identity and Difference, On the Way to Language*, and “Phenomenology and Theology.”³ Moreover, in feats of ventriloquism some translators have gone so far as to invent sentences and place them in Heidegger’s mouth – e.g., *On Time and Being*, 19.14–16 and *What is Called Thinking?* 139.1–6. Until translators like Albert Hofstadter and David Krell came on the scene (and more recently Reginald Lilly and William McNeill), readers could not always be sure that the translations they owned were in truth Heidegger, the whole Heidegger, and nothing but Heidegger.

The need for a new translation of SZ

There are many reasons that might justify a new English translation, among them:

- the appearance of GA, which contains scores of alterations along with Heidegger’s 157 marginal notes to his own text;
- the need for a translation that improves on MR; and
- the need to restate SZ’s argument in readable English.

In other words, we need:

1. *An up-dated English edition, incorporating Heidegger’s textual changes and marginal notes.* Between the sixth and seventh editions of SZ (1949–53) about 480 changes were made in the German text. Hundreds more have been introduced since MR appeared, including some 300 changes since 1976 alone.⁴ The new translation would be an up-dated English edition that translates Heidegger’s marginal notes and incorporates his own alterations to the text.

2. *A well-edited and improved translation.* The new text would have to be better than MR. It would not only correct mistranslations in the earlier version but also remove any editorial mistakes and avoid introducing new errors of its own.

3. *A fresh statement of SZ’s argument in readable prose.* Thirty-five years ago MR saddled English readers with a weird philosophical dialect that sounds more arcane in English than Heidegger himself does in German. It is one thing for a translation to be idiosyncratic, quite another for it to be bizarre. The often grotesque language of MR obscures an understanding of Heidegger’s message; and even more grotesque is the fact that many believe his philosophy to be inextricable from such esoteric gibberish. Without sacrificing accuracy, a new translation would need to be more fluent than MR – or at least no more awkward. It would avoid falling back on the kind of Germanized English that Mark Twain loved to parody, and it would restate Heidegger’s philosophy

afresh in a natural English prose. Merely varying the tired terminology of MR or mimicking its obfuscating style would not do the trick. In fact, it would offer a good reason for sticking with the old translation.

How, then, does JS measure up? At the outset I wish to say that this new translation is a welcome event, insofar as it provides yet another point of view and another ray of light on the inexhaustible riches of SZ. One need not agree with everything in JS to appreciate its stimulating and useful insights.

1. Is JS a complete and up-dated English edition?

Which edition of *Sein und Zeit* did Prof. Stambaugh translate – GA (Klostermann) or SZ (Niemeyer)? And if the latter, which edition? Given the hundreds of textual alterations over the years, this is an important question. But JS provides no answer. Nowhere in the text is the least reference made to GA, not even to Heidegger's marginalia. The latter simply show up unannounced at the bottom of the pages, and unless we know from elsewhere what they are, we are left completely in the dark.

Prof. Stambaugh has translated not GA but the Niemeyer-SZ, possibly the twelfth edition (1972) but probably the tenth (1963). How can we know which edition it was? One way would be to ask Prof. Stambaugh. Short of that, one resorts to detective work. A scrutiny of Prof. Stambaugh's cleanly retyped manuscript (the basis for the published book) reveals that everywhere in the body of the text she translates a Niemeyer version. (Compare, e.g., ms. 89.18 with GA 120.4; ms. 119.1/GA 141.13; ms. 315.13–14/GA 273.33; ms. 317.13/GA 275.13, and so on.) Then a close examination of her earliest draft translation (from the 1970s) reveals her reliance on the tenth edition of 1963.⁵ What we have in JS, then, is a translation not of GA but of a Niemeyer edition that is thirty-five years out of date. The closest JS comes to GA is in its translation of Heidegger's marginal notes – which, however, comprise only .8% of the text, less than 2000 words out of 250,000.

JS thus fails to incorporate hundreds of alterations made over the last decades. I have checked only twenty of those alterations (one can only do so much), and I find that JS incorporates four of them (20%) but neglects the other sixteen (80%).⁶ (Those four, and a few others, were caught by the translator/editors during a frenzied last-minute check of the page proofs against GA in the summer of 1996.)⁷ Moreover, in the rare instances where it does incorporate alterations, JS gives no indication of that fact. What, then, was the principle for incorporating some alterations and neglecting others? In the present endnote I list some of the omitted changes.⁸

JS also introduces its own (unannounced) alterations to Heidegger's footnotes. The translator/editors of JS have seen fit to alter Heidegger's footnotes

without giving notice or justification. Many notes in SZ refer to other parts of the book by the *section number* and *its opening page*. The latter, of course, is redundant, and so the translator/editors dropped all of them from the endnotes in JS. One might see their point. But they went further and dropped out additional *informative* page references that indicate, within a given section, a specific page to which Heidegger refers his reader. Thus, for example note 2 at SZ 267 (“Vgl. §27, S. 126ff., bes. S. 130”) gets reduced to simply “Cf. section 27.” There are over a dozen such alterations to Heidegger’s footnotes.

But what about Heidegger’s marginal notes in JS? Surely whatever else got omitted, these (one might say) constitute the most valuable presence of GA in JS. But unfortunately the marginal notes in this volume are little short of a mess. Prof. Stambaugh’s translation of them has remained unchanged since the 1970s, and they are replete with the same careless mistakes as back then, some of them certainly minor, but most of them not. By my count, 11% of the notes are marred by mistranslations and other errors, including:

- *Omissions and misspellings.* For openers, one of the marginal notes is omitted outright: Heidegger’s critical remark about Husserl’s *Ideen* II (GA 63 note “a,” keyed to SZ 47 n1). Then at 223n, an equal sign (=) that stands for “ist” gets omitted, thereby rendering the sentence unintelligible (“der Tod selber = seine Ankunft” is not “death itself – its arrival”). At 250n “dieses” is omitted; thus “the experience of being” seems to refer to “being in general” instead of to the call of conscience. There is a bad omen already in the first marginal note (JS 2n): It manages to misspell a German word it cites (and a key word at that: *Seiend* not *Seiende*; cf. JS 84n). The slip is altogether typical of the sloppiness of the volume.

- *Mistranslations and errors.* In the next two endnotes I list (a) some significant mistranslations in these notes⁹ and (b) some minor errors that make the notes more difficult to understand than need be.¹⁰

2. Is JS a cleanly edited, improved translation of SZ?

How is the translation?

There are many levels on which one might answer this question – the grammatical accuracy, the choice of English terms, the readability of the prose. Here I focus only on the issue of grammatical and syntactical accuracy.

Errors are thick on the ground in JS. In any translation one expects some mistakes, but this volume is overrun with them. I have not compared JS word-for-word against the German, but even a random check reveals an appalling number of omissions, mistranslations, important syntactical errors and minor

mistakes. (In what follows, the numbers outside parentheses refer to JS, those inside refer to SZ.

- *Omissions.* A sample includes 10.35 (12.32): *hierbei* führende; 52.9 (55.30): keines; 55.4–5 (58.36): zunächst; 61.6 (65.6): als dieses; 75.29 (81.4,6): muß . . . sein; 100.25 (108.8): vom Dasein; 117.32 (125.14): defizienten; 125.23 (133.6): gelichtet; 405 n8 does not translate but simply reprints SZ 201 n1.

- *Mistranslations.* Many of these mistakes could have been avoided if Prof. Stambaugh had simply checked her manuscript against the existing translations in French, Italian and Spanish,¹¹ not to mention MR. In the following endnote I provide a list of some significant mistranslations.¹²

- *Syntactically incorrect translations.* All too frequently JS undoes the meaning of a sentence by carelessly misplacing phrases or clauses. The issue here is one of elementary syntax. I provide some examples in this endnote.¹³

- *Et alibi, aliorum plurimorum errorum.* A considerable number of minor mistranslations litter the text. The cumulative effect is to make the volume appear careless and unreliable. The following endnote provides some examples.¹⁴

What about the editing of JS?

The book is lovely to look at – handsomely printed and bound, a tribute to the printer's art. The problems arise when one looks inside. Clearly this book was edited in a rush, and a price was paid for that haste: The text swarms with editorial errors.

- *The Greek gets badly mangled.* To begin with, the Greek is printed in hodgepodge fashion. The epigram from the *Sophist* is set in Greek characters (p. xix), but in the body of the text all Greek words are transliterated. What is worse, the transliterated Greek is riddled with orthographical errors, misspellings, and inconsistencies. This may seem trivial; but it is just another example of how the editorial quality of JS lags far behind MR. The simple solution would have been to set all the Greek (not just the epigram) in Greek characters. Surely if readers do not understand a text printed in Greek, there is little chance they will understand it any better when it is transliterated. The following endnote lists some of the errors in the Greek.¹⁵

- *If the devil is in the details, JS is an inferno.* JS is rife with editorial mistakes that often make readings go awry. The following endnote lists some examples that might have been caught in a more rigorous editing process.¹⁶

3. Does JS provide a restatement of SZ in readable prose?

Whether or not JS is “readable” will be decided by individual readers. *Quot homines, tot sententiae*. The ideal would be to smooth out the often awkward prose of MR, perhaps by risking an occasional paraphrase, or dipping into informal English, or gliding over an insignificant German adverb without losing the sense.

Unfortunately, however, there is a pervasive ponderousness to JS that reminds us of Mark Twain’s parodies. (“In the hospital yesterday, a word of thirteen syllables was successfully removed from a patient, a North-German from near Hamburg.”) Some rewriting might have helped. Take JS 57.16–18, for example: “Apart from the fact that in the question just formulated, the ‘standpoint’ – which is again not demonstrated phenomenally but is rather constructivist – makes its appearance. . . .” Doesn’t that sound a bit like Twain? “But when he, upon the street, the in-satin-and-silk-covered-now-very-unconstrainedly-after-the-newest-fashion-dressed government counselor’s wife met. . . .”

The text of JS might be lightened up a bit. For example, instead of “Terminologically, we shall formulate this being towards possibility as anticipation of this possibility” (JS 242.13–14), one might say “The term we use for being toward possibility is anticipation of possibility.” Or instead of “Thus death reveals itself as the ownmost nonrelational possibility not to be bypassed” (JS, 232.23–24), it could be “Thus death is seen to be one’s ownmost, exclusive, and inevitable possibility.” I realize, of course, that it is one thing to dash off a line or two as above, and quite another to labor over the 16,000 lines of difficult German that comprise SZ. That is why one’s hat is off to Prof. Stambaugh for her Herculean efforts with this text.

More serious, however, is the fact that JS repeats the philosophical misunderstandings of MR at those very junctures where a fresh formulation of the argument is most needed. I have in mind JS’s translations of SZ §65 and §74. Successfully or not, a case has been made that “having-been” is a momentarily wrong translation of “das Gewesen” and “die Gewesenheit”; that “Zukunft” and its forms would be better translated in terms of “becoming” one’s self (cf. SZ 199.15), and that “handing down” entirely loses the sense of “überliefern.”¹⁷ What would happen if JS risked some fresh readings of those passages? Compare:

- **JS 300.7–12:** Futurally coming back to itself, resoluteness brings itself to the situation in making it present. Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified

phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having-been *temporality*.

SZ 326.17–21: In *becoming* and thus returning to what one *already is*, resolution enters the situation and *makes present*. Alreadiness emerges out of becoming, such that one's already-operative (indeed, already *operating*) becoming bestows the present. This unified phenomenon – one's already-operative, presence-bestowing becoming – is what we call *temporality*.

- **JS 352.19–23:** Only a being that is essentially *futural* in its being so that it can let itself be thrown back upon its factual There, free for its death and shattering itself on it, that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially *having-been*, can hand down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be *in the Moment* for “its time.”

SZ 385.11–18: Only an entity whose being is essentially *becoming*, such that it can be thrown back onto its factual openness by being free for and shattering against its death – that is, only an entity whose *alreadiness* is co-original with its becoming – can free up for itself its inherited possibility, appropriate its own thrownness, and thus be *in the right time* for its age.

The second set of readings may be just as clumsy as the first. But at least they risk something with the text.

Postscript: A modest proposal

As bad as one thinks this volume is, I believe it opens up an exciting possibility by showing how we might handle translations in the future. Given the technology at hand, everyone should be able to follow Prof. Stambaugh's example and create his or her own rendering of SZ. We really can and should “let a hundred translations bloom.” Let every woman be her own translator, every man his own hermeneut – and let them share their results.

When I began writing this review, I intended to suggest that SUNY Press do the noble thing. Having charged us \$20 (paperback) or \$60 (hardcover) for such a deeply flawed text, the Press (so I thought) should do one of two things: either give us back our money – or give us the text of the translation on disk, gratis, so that each of us, using the “search-and-change” key, could create his or her own version of *Being and Time*. That was to be the “modest proposal” of my subtitle.

But the other day (March 7) a colleague informed me that a graduate student in Australia has already typed a translation of SZ into a computer and put it up

on a Web site. I do not use the Web myself, but I understand that, with a little ingenuity, anyone can now download it and reinvent Heidegger *ad libitum*. “One, two, a hundred *Being and Time*’s!” Mark Twain would be amused.

Wenn aber man kann nicht meinem Rede verstehen, so werde ich ihm später dasselbe übersetz, wenn er solche Dienst verlangen wollen haben werden sollen sein hätte.¹⁸

Notes

1. Roderick MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution* (New York: Columbia U.P. 1974) I, 51. On Mark Twain’s letter to Bayard Taylor, see *Mark Twain’s Notebooks and Journals*, ed. Frederick Anderson, Lin Salamo, and Bernard L. Stein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), II, 254 and n. 81.
2. 9.16, 61.15, 76.10, 139.1–6, 157.15 (four paragraphs), 124.6, 144.21, 205.25, 236.8, 236.19.
3. *On Time and Being*: 15.13, 36.32, 50.24, 80.5. *Identity and Difference*: 36.14. *On the Way to Language*: 12.4, 114.17, 123.12, 155.29, 170.31. Re “Phenomenology and Theology” see *The New Scholasticism*, 53 (1979), 540–544.
4. Rainer A. Bast and Heinrich P. Delfosse, *Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’*, (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1979), 390.
5. **Hypothesis: the tenth edition (1963)**. Using Prof. Stambaugh’s original typed ms. from the 1970s, as well as Bast/Delfosse, 428, one may discern: **(1)** *The terminus a quo*: **(1a)** A comparison of ms. 385.21 against all fifteen German editions shows that her use of *hokōs* rather than *hopōs* at JS 201.18 excludes the first through the sixth editions of SZ (1927–49), unless **(1b)** she used the Sonderdruck edition (*ὄκως* appears there at 219.30) – which is extremely unlikely, since the text is so rare. **(2)** *The terminus ad quem*: **(2a)** Since JS 1–35 simply reprints *Basic Writings* (1977) 41–89 with minor changes; and **(2b)** since *Basic Writings* 41n says: “The German text is Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, twelfth, unaltered edition (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972), pp. 1–40” – one concludes **(2c)** that JS 1–35 translates SZ from an edition between the seventh and the twelfth inclusive. **(3)** What then about the rest of the book? **(3a)** Prof. Stambaugh provides a tell-tale note at JS 401 n2 (keyed to “broken” at 71.31): “Misprint in the German original. Read *Brüche* instead of *Brücke*.” (The same note appears in her original ms.) **(3b)** But that misprint appears only in the seventh through the tenth editions of SZ (1953–63). **(3c)** Then by a process of elimination – by checking SZ 44.29 = JS 42.10 (Zugangsort vs. Zugangsart; cf. ms. 93.13) and 61.25 = JS 57.26 (als Besorgen vs. das Besorgen) – one can eliminate the seventh through the ninth editions. **(3d)** That leaves the tenth edition, published in 1963: *Quod erat demonstrandum*. But it is also possible that she checked the tenth edition against the twelfth. The best way, then, is to ask Prof. Stambaugh.
6. **JS incorporates some changes**. The four are at: 84.4 = GA 120.4; 98.11 = GA 141.13; 192.27–28 = GA 275.13; 392.1 = GA 565.10.
7. **The frenzied check**. This is confirmed through a line-by-line comparison of the penultimate page proofs (spring 1996) with the final ones (summer 1996).
8. **Some alterations that JS omits**: 10.20/GA 16.23/SZ 12.15: “Sein” > “Sinn.” 12.16/GA 19.16/SZ 14.19–20: “d.h. übereinzukommen.” 3.36/GA 7.4/SZ 5.8: “Geleit” > “Direktion.” 11.10/GA 17.29/SZ 13.7: “Sein überhaupt” > “Sein.” 39.15/GA 56.18/SZ 42.10: “nach der Überlieferung.” 41.6/GA 58.19/SZ 43.22: “d.h. zugleich.” 46.8/GA 66.11/SZ

- 49.18: “allein.” 61.27/GA 88.17/SZ 65.27: “in diesem Sinne.” 65.17/GA 93.26/SZ 69.24: “Sicherheit” > “Dinghaftigkeit.” 94.20/GA 136.2/SZ 101.31: “wesentlichen” > “konstitutiven.” 96.13/GA 138.20/SZ 103.27: “als solche.” 112.27/GA 159.23/SZ 119.25: “strittig” > “kontrovers.” 191.30/GA 273.33/SZ 206.29: “sie dann durch Beweise auferstehen zu lassen:” > “sie dann erst zu beweisen.” 221.31/GA 317.14/SZ 238.14: “bloßen.” 287.9/GA 411.25/SZ 310.28: “geliebene.” 289.5/GA 414.18/SZ 313.2–3: “einer jeweiligen Freigabe” > “zur Freigabe.” The list goes on.
9. **Significant mistranslations in the marginalia.** • 87n (= GA 26n/SZ 94.7): “‘real’ zur Sachheit gehörig, zum Was, was allein uns so oder so angehen kann” does not mean “‘Real’ belonging to thinghood (*Sachheit*), to what alone can concern us in this or that way.” The translation should at least say “. . . to the what, which alone can . . .” and it should re-think “Sachheit” in terms of “whatness” (cf. *infra re* 187n). • 178n (= GA 253n/SZ 191.4): “. . . sondern als zu übernehmend geworfen” does not mean “. . . but to be taken over in throwness.” The note indicates that one’s Dasein is always thrown and is to be taken over as thrown. • 187n (= GA 267n/SZ 202.11): “. . . *realitas* als ‘Sachheit’ ” does not mean “*realitas* as factuality” but “reality” as “whatness” as contrasted with “thatness.” • 125n is wrong on at least three accounts: it neglects to translate the German “in” plus accusative; “perdure” is never transitive in English; and “perdure” cannot translate a transitive “ausstehen.” Perhaps the English should read: “Thus existence is standing out into, and enduring, the openness of the there: ek-sistence.” This wrong use of “perdure” shows up also at • 5n (= GA 9n/SZ 7.7): “Da-sein (perduring the truth of being)”; • 39n (= GA 56n): “to perdure being as such”; and • 175n (= GA 249n/SZ 187.20) “what is . . . not to be perdured.” • 287n (= GA 412n/SZ 311.17): “Die Ontik” does not mean “the ontic” (i.e., a being) but an investigation, account, or discipline related to the ontic. • 299n (= GA 430n/SZ 325.15): Here “Sichversetzen” does not mean “self-engagement” but something like “the placing of oneself into. . .”
10. **Other errors and uncertainties in the marginalia.** • 7n: page reference omitted. • 34n: “Zeitlichkeit” comes out as “temporal”; • 40n: “Jemeinigkeit” is changed from a noun to an adjectival phrase (“in each case my own”); in the text it is a noun phrase “[the state of] always-being-my-own-being.” • 57n: Isn’t “Betrachten” in this case (GA 83n) “inspecting” or “scrutinizing” rather than just “looking”? • 79, note a: One cannot tell whether “being” translates “das Sein” or “das Seiende.” Likewise it is often difficult to tell whether “being” is translating “Seyn” or “Sein”: e.g., 6n, 34n (which has both “Seyn” and “das Seyendes”), 40n, 79n, 175n, 233n. Once, in fact, we find “Being” capitalized (40n), a hold-over from Prof. Stambaugh’s earliest typed ms., p. 87. • 134n: “fundamentalontologisch” comes out misleadingly as “Fundamentally and ontologically” (cf. 407n and 229n). • 138n: not “by the grace of the project” but “thanks to [or: due to] the project.” • 187n: Probably it should be “Here we have to differentiate: . . .” rather than simply “To differentiate: . . .” Some minor indecisions mar the marginal notes: • “Ereignis” is translated as “Event” at 34n and as “appropriation” at 217n; • at 10n “Existenz” is given in the same note as both “Existenz” and “existence” (cf. 11n and 34n); • “Existenzphilosophie” comes out “a philosophy of existence” at 14n and as “existential philosophy” at 397n. • Minor errors in the marginalia: 39n, 64n, and 293n omit exclamation points and italics; 64n takes “idea” as an English rather than a Greek word.
11. **Other translations.** *Être et Temps*, tr. E. Martineau, (Paris: Authentica, 1985). *Essere e tempo*, tr. Pietro Chiodi (Milano: Longanesi, 1970). *El Ser y el Tiempo*, tr. José Gaos (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1971). Hereinafter abbreviated “F,” “I,” and “S” respectively.
12. **Some significant mistranslations in JS.** • 28.40 (32.28): not “Speech ‘lets us see,’ from itself, *apo*” but “Speech ‘lets us see’ *apo*.” • 40.4 (42.19–20): “So-sein”: not “thatness” but “being-this-way-or-that” (F 54, I 64, S 54, MR 67.25–26). • 107.15 (114.2–3): not “Who is it who is in the everydayness of Da-sein?” but “Who is Dasein in its everydayness?” or “Who is it that Dasein is in everydayness?” (F 100, S 129, MR 149.17). • 116.23–24 (124.1–2): Here “das Sicherkennen” is not “knowing oneself” but “knowing one another.”

- (F 106, I 169; S 140). • 116.30–36 (124.8–14): Virtually the entire paragraph is wrong (viz., *Sicherkennen*; also “*hinter sie kommen*” is not “see through them”: F 106.33–38, I, 160.14–20, S 140.35–42). • 129.37 (137.30–31): not “the kind of being attuned to being-in-the-world” but “whose kind of being is an attuned being-in-the-world.” • 139.33,35 (149.1,3): “*auseinanderlegen*” is not “to interpret.” Heidegger is referring to *διαίρεσις*. • 248.12–13 (268.15–16): The context shows that “*Nachholen einer Wahl*” is not “making up for a choice” but “recovering” or “re-doing” a choice. (Cf. F 195: *re-saisie d’un choix*; I 326: *ripresa della scelta*). • 248.16 (268.18): Here “*allererst*” is not “first and foremost” but “for the first time.” (F 195: *pour la première fois*; S 292: *por primera vez*). • 251.5–6 (271.15–16): not “What this gives us to understand in calling is conscience” but “That which, by calling in this way, gives us to understand, is conscience.” (F 197, I 329, S 295, MR, 316.13–14). • 299.15 (325.22): “. . . die Möglichkeit aushält,” is not “. . . [can] perdue the possibility.” • 299.17–18 (325.23): “*die ausgezeichnete Möglichkeit aushaltende*,” is not “. . . perdures the eminent possibility.” (Cf. also Prof. Stambaugh’s “perdurance” for “*Austrag*,” *Identity and Difference*, 72. It seems in all these cases she was searching for “endure.”) • 309.38 (336.25–26): “*in einem Meinen*” is not “by opening it.” • 46.39–41 (50.14–16): not “these ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material” but “can never be disclosed subsequently from empirical material by the use of hypotheses.” (F 59, I 73, S 62.) • 56.29 (60.20): Here “*festhält*” is not “bears in mind” but “establishes,” “holds the notion,” or even “claims.” (F 65: *l’on établit*; I 85: *si afferma*; S 73: *se constata*; MR 87.15: *maintains*.) • 58.20 (62.18) translates “*ist*” as “exists,” and 291.5 (315.11) renders “*Seiend*” as “Existing.” • 117.22 (125.2–4) misconstrues a dative as an accusative: “*dem Anderem als Anderem erschließen*” becomes “to disclose the other as other.” • 141.42 (151.20): “*auf Welt hin*. . . , *das heißt auf ein Ganzes von Bedeutsamkeit*” is not “toward the world, that is, toward a totality of significance” but “in terms of world, that is, in terms of a totality of significance.”
13. **Syntactical mistranslations.** • 116.23–24 (124.1–2): “Knowing [one another] is grounded in primordially understanding being-with”: This lets “understanding” be read as a gerund with “being-with” as its object (vs. “*gründet in dem ursprünglich verstehenden Mitsein*.”) • 125.12–13 (132.36–37): *Dasein* is not “a being which has disclosed spatiality as the being of the there” but “a being which, as the being of the there, has disclosed spatiality” (“. . . ein Seiendes ist, das als Sein des ‘Da’ Räumlichkeit erschlossen hat.”) (F 112, S 149, I 170.) • 141.44–142.2 writes: “When with the being of *Da-sein* innerworldly beings are discovered, that is, have come to be understood, we say that they have *meaning*.” But SZ 151.22–24 has a different sense: “When innerworldly beings are discovered along with the being of *Dasein* – i.e., when they come to be understood – we say they have *meaning*.” That is, “To-be-discovered-along-with-the-being-of-*Dasein*” is to have meaning. (F 123, I 192, S 169, MR 192.36). • 262.41 writes: “Existing, *Da-sein* is its ground, that is, in such a way that it understands itself in terms of possibilities. . . .” But SZ 285.6–7 conveys the sense of: “*Dasein* is its ground by existing, i.e., in such a way that it understands itself in terms of possibilities. . . .” • 378.11 writes: “. . . since *Da-sein* is always already disclosed as ecstatic and temporal . . .,” whereas SZ 411.25–26 says: “. . . since *Dasein*, as ecstatic-temporal, is always already disclosed. . . .” (F 281; I 492; S 443; MR 464.20–21.) • 414 n. 14 (399 n1): The clause “that is essential . . .” is misplaced. • 75.28–35: “But, one will protest, *what* is taken as a sign must, after all, first have become accessible in itself and grasped *before* establishing the sign.” Note that “be” or “must be” is omitted before “grasped” and that “*before* establishing the sign” is grammatically incorrect. • A minor point: • 339 n4: Retain the semicolon after “absurdity” since the next sentences are in apposition to that word.
14. **Other mistranslations.** • Page v.3: “in admiration and friendship” rather than “in friendship and admiration.” • P. xvii.3: Change to “*Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*.” • 49.17 (53.8): “on the basis of” (“auf dem Grunde) not “as grounded upon.” • 58.2 (61.40; cf. JS 57.30): “*Sichenthalten*”: “refraining from” not “the refusal to.” • 70.13 (75.3) “*leuchtet auf*”: “lights up” not just “appears.” • At 93.24, “for the first

time” modifies all three noun phrases, not just the second one. ● 99.29 (107.9) “dieses gebrauchte Zeug”: “this implement that is being utilized,” not “this useful thing.” ● 125.20–21 (133.3): “it *is* in such a way as to be its there” not “it *is* in the mode of being its there.” ● 248.31–32 (268.33): “in die thematische Vorhabe” is not “something we have in advance thematically.” ● 277.30 (301.23): “. . . being in general,” not “. . . being as such.” ● 406 n19 (210 n1): “A remark while correcting the galleys” not “Note in the galleys” ● 407 n34 (218 n1): Read: “. . . as his *Lehre vom Urteil* (1912) was by the aforementioned sections on evidence and truth.” ● 408 n6, 410 n17 (249 n1, 301–2 n1): “limit situation” (Grenzsituation) not “borderline situation.” ● 414 n14 (399 n1): This note needs to be rewritten. ● 415 n4 (417–18 n): “axiomatics” not “axiomatic.” ● 415 n5 (419 n1): “more recent [neuere] chronology” not “newer chronology.”

15. **Macrons.** The editors elected to use a macron over e and o when they stand for η and ω , but the result is in total disarray. The following numbers indicate the pages and lines of JS where transliterations of the Greek are in error: 42.16; 42.21; 125n; 130.20 (both the macron and the iota subscript are omitted); 130.30; 130.8; 197.2 (two words); 197.5 (two words); 197.7; 197.8; 197.10; 198.16; 202.25; 207.38 (the word is misspelled as well); 314.16 (the word is transliterated incorrectly as well); 314.15; 388.5; 407 n39; 417.22; 417.35. A minor misprint: “*apophainesthia*” at 197.8.

Upsilon. Sometimes upsilon comes out as “y” (mython, 6; synthesis, 29; hysteron, 386), sometimes as “u” (sunonumos 86; lupe, 314; adunaton, 391), and sometimes as both “y” and “u” (hypokeymenon, 30 vs. hupokeimenon, 43 and 294; phusei, 160 vs. physis, 187n and 196n).

Iota subscripts. The text consistently omits transcribing iota subscripts (cf. *Chicago Manual of Style*, 9.121), for example: logōi: 205; zōion: 22, 45, 154, 484; and similar errors at 79n, 130.20, 197.12, 484 (last entry).

Rough breathings. These are rendered inconsistently. Cf. kath’ auto at 15n vs. kath’ homoiōsin at 45.

The Latin fares much better, although “capax mutationum” comes out “capax mutationem” at 89.10, and “nominum” appears as “nomimum” at 402 n15.

16. **Some editorial oversights in JS.** ● At 52.3 what does “it” modify, the one touching or the touched? ● 75.23–26 is unintelligible: “. . . the south wind is *never initially* objectively present which sometimes takes on the function of omen.” ● 20.5–6 fails to italicize “destructuring” whereas 15.5, 305.38 (etc.) italicize too many words. ● 399 n3: The reference in the *Summa* is “I–II” (Prima Secundae), not “II, 1.” ● 400 n4: “243” not “385.” ● 400 n6: “246” not “388.” ● 403 n2: Italicize “Gesammelte Schriften.” ● 407 n34 italicize the titles of Lask’s two works. ● 404 n11: After *Ideen* add “pp. 255ff.” ● 405 n8: Read “pp. 83ff. and 92f” (i.e., the English pages) instead of “89ff. and 99f.” (the German pages; in any case, why “99ff.” instead of “100ff.”?). ● 406 n21, n26: Change “A” to “I” for editorial consistency. (Cf. e.g., 399 n1, n3, 404 n7, n12, and *passim*.) ● 407 n34: “§36–39” not “pp. 36–39”; also add the missing page reference: “pp. 115ff.” ● 407 n40: The title of §34 given here differs from the title given in the main body of the text (“Assertion” vs. “Statement”). ● 408 n3: If the title of Husserl’s “Investigation” was given in German at 407 n34, why does a parallel title appear here in English? ● 410 n2: What does the word “its” refer to in the phrase “condition of its factual possibility”? (Cf. SZ 306 n1) ● 411.1: “guilt” not “guilty.” ● 414 n12: Italicize “Briefwechsel . . . 1897.” ● 414 n13: Write “*Briefwechsel*” not “Correspondence.” ● Required commas are frequently omitted, e.g., 97.26 (between “Dasein” and “of which”), 129.17 (after “third”), 293.20 (between “Dasein” and “whose”), and so on. ● The word “only” is misplaced *passim*, thereby often skewing the meaning. (I invent the following example simply to illustrate the problem: “They kissed only yesterday” vs. “They only kissed yesterday.”) ● Misprints are fortunately rare: “curcumspective” 129.22, “*Vernurft*” 401 n.11. ● *De gustibus non disputandum est*: Purists will weep for the fact that JS *passim* uses the relative pronoun “which” instead of “that” to introduce restrictive clauses – but you can’t have everything.

17. See *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire*, ed. Babette Babich (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), 157–77; *American Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (1995), 275–294; *Research in Phenomenology* 25 (1995), 207–225.
18. “(I don’t know what wollen haben werden sollen sein hätte means, but I notice they always put it at the end of a German sentence – merely for general literary gorgeousness, I suppose.)” Mark Twain, *A Tramp Abroad*, The Oxford Mark Twain, Shelley Fisher Fishkin, ed. (New York and Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1996), 618.