ABSTRACT
[1] The aim of this investigation is to set the bounds of relevance for the thesis of conventional source of meaning.
The term convention is usually interpreted in the philosophy of language as an abstraction that presupposes that the situation of using of a natural language had such a form as if the members of the language community had preliminary agreed:
A semantic theory can use any of these factors in any combination; whats then their common ground or, rather, whats the first base of such a common ground?
[2] If conventions were accepted for the sake of successful communication for the common goals would be generated and it would be possible to reach them in the field of intersubjective interaction then all those goals and the ways of their carrying out must be also conventionally pregiven together with the understanding of what is the success of communication as such.
It means that the possibility of a situation of a certain type (e.g., the possibility of the question What does the snow look like?) and specific ways of putting it in order linguistically (or to resolve it) in such manner that would allow the situation to develop in pregiven direction must be the common point of departure for all participants of virtual dialogue.
[3] Suppose a Zulu boy coming to a Soviet Cultural Centre to ask: Tell me please, what does the snow look like?. Let us take two ways of development of this situation. One teacher (A) frankly explains that the snow is to be white, etc. And the other (B), unluckily for the boy, happens to practise Zen and, instead of answering, hits the poor fellow upon his head with a stick. Both teachers meant the same situation: both of them realized there was a question the question and it was addressed to them, and, furthermore, they realized the situation must be carried out in the direction of the pupils grasping the point. One may think that both of the teachers, A and B, tried to reach the same goal (or the similar goals); but their approaches to the successful fulfillment of the given situation were different. If the disciple and any observer had expected to hear an explanation as a reaction to the question then the B teachers behavior would surprise them. Within this context (the context of definite grasping of the situation that we could mean conventionally pregiven) the manner to resolve the situation of B will direct its carrying out, on the contrary, away from the given goal (understanding). Meanwhile for B his activity means bringing the goal closer.
Thus every situation that we could take as an example of fulfillment of some convention is demonstrated to be a teleological unity of linguistic and non-linguistic activity. A situation like this is meant to be developed toward a certain goal when the language is correctly used in it. The linguistic expression is used in the right way, let us say, when the speakers goal is reached or when there was at least some movement toward this goal.
[4] Since the convention is concluded between members of some community exactly between all who speaks language L about the success of communication, one can believe that some members of this community hadnt had any primordial idea of success of communication: then, one can say, they perceived this idea together with a certain convention. But would such convention be possible when no one or only one member of the community had any primordial idea of about what they are convening?
We must admit that convention is to have some foundations in what we may call correlation of individual beliefs of the members of the community. It is safe to say that for each individual his own beliefs form his individual conceptual scheme.
[5] Suppose A and B, old good Soviet kulturtregers in Zululand, both believe there must be life after death. Both of them speak the same language and can understand each other. But A, being an Orthodox Christian, can not in any way accept Bs Zen proof of his belief to be a real or valuable proof. It means that the coincidence of As and Bs beliefs in life after death could not be a ground for mutual verification of beliefs. Since we cannot say that they had any field of intersubjective correspondence, adequation and verification of truths and other theses common to both of them, nothing prevents us from believing in that A and B depart from different conventions in their activities; but the very form of such an analysis shows that it seems still reasonable to speak about the functional bounds of conventions in terms of analysing the problem of intersubjective correspondence of beliefs. Although one can describe the distinction between the positions of A and B in regard to the question: what must be the proof?, It nevertheless expresses the corresponding distinction between the two conceptual schemes.
So we can say that conceptual scheme is an individual world view formed by the system of mental representations (concepts). Obviously, it must also imply the conditions of provability, truth, relevance, etc.
[6] Let us look how some expression P could be true relative to one conceptual scheme W1 and at the same time false relative to the other conceptual scheme W2.
An approach according to which P would have only one associated W has been called by C. Swoyer strong relativism vs. weak relativism where an expression could be true relative to W1 and simply inexpressible in the terms of W2.
The value of the weak sort of the relative truth concept for the proof of linguistic convention will depend on the possibility of existence of radically different conceptual schemes. If an agreement about using of P works in the community with the language L including n members it means P is true relative to W1, W2, ... Wn. Then W1, W2, ... Wn must have some area of intersection X . It will contain a set of all statements trivially true for everybody who speaks L. Therefore X will be described by an intensional function, the area of definition of which is the set of all possible correct statements of the language L and the area of value is the set of all possible true references expressible in this language.
[7] The logic of our language implies true references: all we can say about the world was constituted this way. And the logic of a hypothetical language M, let us suppose, does not imply any references at all and, on the contrary, makes everyone who speaks it struggle against occasionally growing references. So with regard to the convention this relation between the statement and the designated thing implies the limits of functioning of certain agreements. We cannot believe the relation implied in such a manner and, accordingly, the inner logic of any language resulted from some convention. Therefore, though the regulative function of convention is obvious enough, there will be irrelevant to state any constitutive function of convention in relation to the meaning.
[8] Thus, while A and B speak the same language, Wa and Wb have common X , but from the examples above we can see that convention would not be a source of intersubjective verification in every case. In our case, to succeed in verification Wa and Wb must have not only common X but also the possibility of further mutual coordination of conceptual schemes. Convention creates the conditions of the interrelation of individual conceptual schemes, which means the coordination of any disagreements; on the other hand, the convention as such is only possible as a result of such mutual coordination of individual conceptual schemes. The process of mutual coordination of individual conceptual schemes, therefore, constitutes the dynamic unity of correlation with the process of generating conventions.