Part 7
Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something
else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other
thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by reference to something
else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly,
the expression 'double' has this external reference, for it is the double
of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this
kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception,
knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by
a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit
of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude
of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned.
Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained
by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or some other preposition
being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great
in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute
by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must
be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external
reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular
attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to
be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid
attitudes.
It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has
a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary,
ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; 'double' and 'triple'
have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.
It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree.
For 'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications
'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in character:
for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear 'unequal' bear a reference to something
external. Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation
of degree. No term such as 'double' admits of this modification. All relatives
have correlatives: by the term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by
the term 'master', the master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its
hall; by 'half', the half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that
which is less; by 'less,' less than that which is greater.
So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to
express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we
mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended
by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible,
that which is apprehended by perception.
Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear
to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the
relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a wing
is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will
not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a
bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original statement
was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua
bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature.
If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal,
for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature,
and of a winged creature as being such because of its
wings.
Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word
exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define
a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will
not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat
qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot use
the terms reciprocally, for the word 'boat' cannot be said to find its
explanation in the word 'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our definition
would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like 'ruddered' as
the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at
any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the 'ruddered' thing
is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head
will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is 'headed',
than as that of an animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal,
since many animals have no head.
Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing
is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name,
we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally
connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word 'winged'
from 'wing' and from 'rudder'.
All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I
add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated
as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent.
Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged
correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence
if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative
notion, but by one of irrelevant significance. The term 'slave,' if defined
as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that
sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is
defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said
to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then,
though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute
left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with
that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative
of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, though all irrelevant
attributes of the said 'master', such as 'biped', 'receptive of knowledge',
'human', should be removed, and the attribute 'master' alone left, the
stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same,
for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other
hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when
all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which
it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to
have disappeared.
For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be
'the man', or the correlative of 'the wing"the bird'; if the attribute
'master' be withdrawn from' the man', the correlation between 'the man'
and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the
slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute 'winged' be withdrawn
from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be relative; for if the so-called
correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the wing' has no
correlative.
Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly
designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if
not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology
is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are
interdependent.
Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously.
This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half.
The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it
is a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence
of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely
instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if
there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this
rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be
true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously.
The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself,
for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already
existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of
knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with
that of its object.
Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels
at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse
of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not
exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to
know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does
not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case
of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge,
though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of
it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist,
there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of
knowledge.
This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object
of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the perceptible
is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation
of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception
implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now
if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is
annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does
not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation
of the perceptible involves that of perception.
But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the
perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception
also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness,
and so on, will remain.
Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving
subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But
the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water and
such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before
the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem
that the perceptible exists before perception.
It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative,
as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case
of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it
is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor
parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is not
defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the parts:
a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of
a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular person. It
is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances;
the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not defined with reference to
anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as
it is some one's property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then,
that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard
to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such
terms as 'head' and 'hand' are defined with reference to that of which
the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear
to have a relative character. Indeed, if our definition of that which is
relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove
that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete,
if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which
relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps
some explanation of the dilemma may be found.
The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the
fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not
make it essentially relative.
From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative
thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative.
Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular thing
is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which
relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that
also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all that to which
it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is
clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely that
such and such a thing is 'double', he will also forthwith know definitely
that of which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which
he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double.
Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily
that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more
beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful
than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition,
not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely that than which it is
more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more
beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be
that nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man
apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also
definitely to which it is related.
Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it
is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not
necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related.
It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus
these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to
say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a difficult
matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive
examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not
without advantage.
Part 8
By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to
be such and such.
Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality
let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition in
being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge
and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate
degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace,
unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such
cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are
not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to
vice.
By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is
easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold,
disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in one
way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold
instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all other dispositions
also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate
and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so
far as to call it a habit.
It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits
which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for
those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to
have such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed,
we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs
from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former
is permanent and difficult to alter.
Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are
not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said
also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who
are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding
habit.
Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example,
we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes
all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things
are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue
of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid
defeat of any kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not
in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity
to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of
the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that
may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity.
Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated
of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it
to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing
by reason of the lack of that capacity.
A third class within this category is that of affective qualities
and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort
of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and
cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident that
these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves
said to be such and such by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet
because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains
whiteness; and so in all other cases.
The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those
things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is not
called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what
is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called affective
qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. What
is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an 'affection'
in the way of perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the
sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these
qualities.
Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not
said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they themselves
are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour
take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when
he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a
man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance
of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has
the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily
elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case
of an access of shame, might be a result of a man's natural temperament,
so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic.
All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent
and lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and
duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to
be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural
constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn,
and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the
same way we are said to be such and such because of
these.
Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily
be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities,
but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of them. The man
who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor
is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale.
He is said rather to have been affected.
Thus such conditions are called affections, not
qualities.
In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the
soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in
certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions
as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or
irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states which
are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements,
and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities,
for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such.
Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective
are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when
vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances
he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions
are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.
The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs
to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other
qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and
such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have
a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in fact
a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of
it.
Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms
indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class
different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain relative position
of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated
by each of these terms. A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts
are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices
between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly;
rough, because some parts project beyond others.
There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly
so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.
These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name
from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are
said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost all
cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the
quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us the
adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on.
There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration
has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a
name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to the runner or
boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived
from that of any quality; for lob those capacities have no name assigned
to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with
reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science
is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling'
as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is
derived from that of the science. Sometimes, even though a name exists
for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a
name that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his
character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name
given him is not derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does not occur
often.
We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed
of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid
quality, or which are in some other way dependent on
it.
One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the
contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, also,
which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be
contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to
that which is just, that which is white to that which is black. This, however,
is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities,
have no contraries.
If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a
quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the
names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that justice
is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also
be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any
other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice.
So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of
quality.
Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated
of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also
the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may
exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is
white, it may become whiter.
Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if
we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties
might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which
are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of
variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well
admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree
in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical
learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However
that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue
of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which
they possess them; for one man is said to be better versed in grammar,
or more healthy or just, than another, and so on.
The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular'
do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have
to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the triangle
or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those,
on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot
be said to differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle
than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate.
In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both
objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit
of variation of degree.
Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar
to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with
reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature.
One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which
it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of
quality.
We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though
proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many
relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were relative.
In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not.
Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else,
for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge
are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything
external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all,
are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said be the
knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is
the knowledge of something, not the music of something.
Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it
is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are
said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are
called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch.
Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which
we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and
are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within both
the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary
in classing it under both these heads.
