Part 9
Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of
degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled,
being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries. They also admit
of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a greater or less
degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. Thus action and
affection also admit of variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with
regard to these categories.
We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing
with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from
those of the corresponding attitudes.
As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible,
I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, that in the category
of state are included such states as 'shod', 'armed', in that of place
'in the Lyceum' and so on, as was explained before.
Part 10
The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt
with.
We must next explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite'
is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives
to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives
to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.
Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of
the word 'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions
'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad' and 'good'.
Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives' are' blindness'
and 'sight'; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions
'he sits', 'he does not sit'.
(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation
are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being
indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other preposition. Thus, double
is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double
of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in
the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to
its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which
is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such things, then, as are
opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained
by a reference of the one to the other.
(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way
interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not
spoken of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is
white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black.
These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those contraries
which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or
of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or
the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of which
no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and
health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary
that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal.
Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that
the one or the other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate
between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those
contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate.
Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not
necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body,
inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black.
Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things,
but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should
be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not true to say
that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These
pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white
and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between;
the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one
nor the other.
Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow
and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases,
however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it
as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither
good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.
(iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same subject.
Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal
rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that
to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We say that that is capable
of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the
faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which,
and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not call
that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight,
but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature
it should. For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight,
or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or
blind.
To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as
the corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive', 'blindness'
a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to 'sight', 'to
be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'. Blindness is a 'privative',
to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a 'privative'.
Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind', both would be
predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he
is by no means said to be blindness.
To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of
being in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and 'privatives' themselves
are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just
as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having
sight.
That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial.
By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by 'denial' a negative.
Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are
not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense
as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis
is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the
two propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so also the fact which constitutes
the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other,
his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting.
It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed
each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by
reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other
preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said
to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover,
reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a
reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative.
But this is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of
blindness.
That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and
'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain
from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they have no
intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in
which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is
those, as we proved,' in the case of which this necessity obtains, that
have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even,
as instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject
to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive
of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something
intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject.
We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the
case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two
contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive
property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately
that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present
in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not
the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject
receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one
forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member
of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must
be present.
In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand,
neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary
that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the
one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight
is natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus 'positives' and
'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of
those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not belong
either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate.
For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the
other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject.
For when a thing has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of
sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate
sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for
it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind,
but that it should be either in the one state or in the other. Yet in the
case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was
never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every
appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair
should be present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain
that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either
of the senses in which contraries are opposed.
Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should
be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity,
unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that
subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that that that which is
healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which
is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad
man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may
make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, even
ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any
rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more and more easily moved
to virtue, however small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore,
natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made
in the past; and as this process goes on, it will change him completely
and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by
lack of time. In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change
in both directions is impossible. There may be a change from possession
to privation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become
blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain
his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow his grow a new set.
(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to
a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case only, it
is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other
false.
Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives,
nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary for one
to be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither
of them is true or false. 'Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other
as correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the same,
of course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as 'sight'
and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of combination of words,
truth and falsity have no place, and all the opposites we have mentioned
so far consist of simple words.
At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements
are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem
to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates
is well', but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say
that one of the pair must always be true and the other false. For if Socrates
exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist,
both will be false; for neither 'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is well'
is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.
In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does
not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject
exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false.
For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in the
sense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and privation.
Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and
the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision,
both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.
But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject
exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly,
if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill', 'Socrates
is not ill', is true, and the other false. This is likewise the case if
he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false,
to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites
only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference
to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the
pair must be true and the other false.
Part 11
That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the
contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But the
contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For defect,
which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil,
and the mean. which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one and of
the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see instances of
this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good.
In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one
exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there will
be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white, there will
be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the
contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions
cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time, both
these contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well
was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be
one.
It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects
which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health require as
their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, without
further qualification; justice and injustice require as their subject the
human soul.
Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all
cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be
themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus, colour; justice
and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good and evil
do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera, with terms under
them.
Part 12
There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior'
to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time:
in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more
ancient than another, for the expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' imply
greater length of time.
Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the sequence
of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' is 'prior' to 'two'.
For if 'two' exists, it follows directly that 'one' must exist, but if
'one' exists, it does not follow necessarily that 'two' exists: thus the
sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the
sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other
depends is called 'prior' to that other.
In the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to
any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which
use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is posterior
in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions; in reading
and writing, the letters of the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly,
in the case of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the
narrative.
Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which
is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In common
parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as 'coming first'
with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most
far-fetched.
Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior'
is used.
Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another.
For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other,
that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature
'prior' to the effect. It is plain that there are instances of this. The
fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition
that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition
wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein
we allege that he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is
in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man's
being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition,
for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the
man's being or not being.
Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses.
Part 13
The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately applied
to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that
of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other.
Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those things,
again, are 'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of each of which
involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the cause
of the other's being. This is the case with regard to the double and the
half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double,
there is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double, while
at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the
other.
Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and
opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be 'simultaneous'
in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished each from each
by one and the same method of division. Thus the 'winged' species is simultaneous
with the 'terrestrial' and the 'water' species. These are distinguished
within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the genus 'animal'
has the 'winged', the 'terrestrial', and the 'water' species, and no one
of these is prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things
appear to be 'simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial,
the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies.
Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' point of nature, which,
belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and
the same method of differentiation.
But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being
cannot be reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there will
be the genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus 'animal', it
does not follow necessarily that there will be the species
'water-animal'.
Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature,
the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same
time neither is in any way the cause of the other's being; those species,
also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same
genus. Those things, moreover, are 'simultaneous' in the unqualified sense
of the word which come into being at the same time.
Part 14
There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase,
diminution, alteration, and change of place.
It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement
are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from destruction, increase
and change of place from diminution, and so on. But in the case of alteration
it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the
other five sorts of motion. This is not true, for we may say that all affections,
or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other
sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either increase
or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a
distinct sort of motion; for, if it were not, the thing altered would not
only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution
or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter
of fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process
of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration
were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration
also. But there are some things which undergo increase but yet not alteration.
The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase
but not alteration, and so it is with all other figures of this sort. Alteration
and increase, therefore, are distinct.
Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different
forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction
is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest in a place,
of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse direction would
seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary
of motion downwards and vice versa.
In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those
that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary.
It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here
also either as 'rest in its quality' or as 'change in the direction of
the contrary quality', just as we defined the contrary of change of place
either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction. For a
thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest
in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called
the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white
is the contrary of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary
direction, since a change of a qualitative nature takes
place.
Part 15
The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place
it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality,
for we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again,
it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man's
height; for he is said to 'have' a height of three or four cubits. It is
used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to 'have' a coat
or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves,
as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us,
as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the case of a vessel
and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to 'have' wine, and a corn-measure
wheat. The expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers
to that which has been acquired; we are said to 'have' a house or a field.
A man is also said to 'have' a wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears
to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean
simply that the husband lives with the wife.
Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary ones
have all been enumerated.
