Non-Samkhyan texts.
Besides the Samkhya-Yoga, which is in the foreground of the epic's philosophical portions, there are Vedanta texts emphasizing the unity of spirits and theistic texts emphasizing not only a personal deity but also the doctrine of avatar (avatara), or incarnation. The Vasudeva-Krishna cult characterizes the theistic part of the epic.

Early theories of kingship and state.
In the Shanti Parvan ("Book of Consolation," 12th book) of the Mahabharata, there is also a notable account of the origin of kingship and of rajadharma, or the dharma (law) of the king as king. Bhisma, who is discoursing, refers with approval to two different theories of the origin of kingship, both of which speak of a prior period in which there were no kings. According to one account, this age was a time characterized by insecurity for the weak and unlimited power for the strong; the other regards it as an age of peace and tranquillity. The latter account contains a theory of the fall of mankind from this ideal state, which led to a need for institutionalized power, or kingship; the former account leads directly from the insecurity of the prekingship era to the installation of king by the divine ruler for the protection and the security of mankind. Kingship is thus recognized as having a historical origin. The primary function of the king is that of protection, and dandaniti, or the art of punishment, is subordinated to rajadharma, or dharma of the king. Though it recognizes a quasi-divinity of the king, the Mahabharata makes the dharma, the moral law, superior to the king.
 

Neither performance of the duties prescribed in the scriptures nor renunciation of all action is conducive to the attainment of moksa. If the goal is freedom, then the best path to the goal is to perform one's duties with a spirit of nonattachment without caring for the fruits of one's actions and without the thought of pleasure or pain, profit or loss, or victory or failure, with a sense of equanimity and equality. The Kantian ethic of "duty for duty's sake" seems to be the nearest Western parallel to Krishna's teaching at this stage. But Krishna soon went beyond it, by pointing out that performance of action with complete nonattachment requires knowledge ( jnana) of the true nature of the self, its distinction from prakrti, or Matter (the primeval stuff, not the world of matter perceived by the senses), with its three component elements (sattva--i.e., tension or harmony; rajas--i.e., activity; and tamas--i.e., inertia), and of the highest self (purusottama), whose higher and lower aspects are Matter and finite individuals, respectively. This knowledge of the highest self or the supreme lord, however, would only require a devotional attitude of complete self-surrender and performance of one's duties in the spirit of offering to him. Thus, karma-yoga (yoga of works) is made to depend on jnana-yoga (yoga of knowledge), and the latter is shown to lead to bhakti-yoga (yoga of devotion). Instead of looking upon Krishna's teaching as laying down alternative ways for different persons in accordance with their aptitudes, it would seem more logical to suppose that he taught the essential unity and interdependence of these ways. How one should begin is left to one's aptitude and spiritual makeup.
 

 The key notion in all this is that of the dhammas. Because Buddhist philosophers denied any permanence, whether in outer nature or in inner life, they felt compelled to undertake a detailed, systematic, and complete listing and classification of the different elements that constitute both the external world and the mental, inner life. Each of these elements, except for the three elements that are not composed of parts (i.e., space, or akasha, and the two cessations, Nirvana and a temporary stoppage, in states of meditation, of the flow of passions, or apratisamkhyanivodha), is momentary. 
The primary object of this exhaustive analysis was an understanding not so much of outer nature as of the human person (pudgala). The human person, however, consists in material (rupa) and mental (nama) factors, which led to an account of the various elements of matter. The primary interest, nevertheless, is in man, who is regarded as an aggregate of various elements. The analysis of these components, together with the underlying denial of an eternal self, was supposed to provide the theoretical basis for the possibility of a good life conducive to the attainment of Nirvana.

 The individual person was analyzed into five aggregates (skandhas): material form (rupa); feeling (vedana); conception (samjna); disposition (samskara); and consciousness (vijnana). Of these, the last four constitute the mental; the first alone is the material factor. The material is further analyzed into 28 states, the samskara into 50 (falling into three groups: intellectual, affectional, and volitional), and the vijnana into 89 kinds of states of consciousness. Another principle of classification leads to a list of 18 elements (dhatus): five sense organs, five objects of those senses, mind, the specific object of mind, and six kinds of consciousness (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual, and purely mental). A third classification is into 12 bases (ayatanas), which is a list of six cognitive faculties and their objects. The Buddhist analysis of matter was in terms of sensations and sense data, to which the sense organs were also added. The analysis of mind was also in terms of corresponding modes of consciousness and their objects.
 

In the works of Panini, a Hindu grammarian, the sutra style reached a perfection never attained before and only imperfectly approximated by the later practitioners. The sutra literature began before the rise of Buddhism, though the philosophical sutras all seem to have been composed afterward. The Buddhist sutta (Pali form of the Sanskrit word sutra) differs markedly in style and content from the Hindu sutra. The suttas are rather didactic texts, discourses, or sermons, possibly deriving their name from the sense in which they carry the thread of the tradition of the Buddha's teachings.
 

 Jaimini's central concern is dharma, which is defined as the desired object (artha), whose desirability is testified only by the injunctive statements of the scriptures (codana-laksano). In order to substantiate the implied thesis that what ought to be done--i.e., dharma--cannot be decided by either perception or reasoning, Jaimini proceeds to a discussion of the nature of ways of knowing. Because perceptual knowledge arises from contact of the sense organs with reality that is present, dharma that is not an existent reality but a future course of action cannot possibly be known by sense-experience. 
Reasoning based on such sense-experience is for the same reason useless. Only injunctive statements can state what ought to be done. Commands made by finite individuals are not reliable, because the validity of what they say depends upon the presumption that the persons concerned are free from those defects that render one's words dependable. Therefore, only the injunctions contained in the scriptures--which, according to Mimamsa and the Hindu tradition, are not composed by any finite individual (apauruseya)--are the sources of all valid knowledge of dharma. The Mimamsa rejects the belief that the scriptures are utterances of God. The words themselves are authoritative. In accordance with this thesis, Jaimini developed the theory that the relation between words and their meanings is natural (autpattikastu shabdasyarthena sambandhah, or "the relation of word to its meaning is eternal") and not conventional, that the primary meaning of a word is a universal (which is also eternal), that in a sentence the principal element is the verb, and that the principal force of the verb is that which specifically belongs to the verb with an optative ending and which instigates a person to take a certain course of action in order to effect the desired end.

Though this theory provided the Mimamsa with a psychological and semantic technique for interpreting the sentences of the scriptures that are clearly in the injunctive form, there are also other kinds of sentences: prayers, glorifications, those referring to a thing by a name, and prohibitions. Attempts were therefore made to show how each one of these types of sentences bears, directly or indirectly, on the central, injunctive texts. Furthermore, a systematic classification of the various forms of injunctions is undertaken: those that indicate the general nature of an action, those that show the connection of a subsidiary rite to the main course of action, those that suggest promptness in performance of the action, and those that indicate the right to enjoy the results to be produced by the course of action enjoined.

The commentary of Shabara elaborated on the epistemological themes of the sutras; in particular, Shabara sought to establish the intrinsic validity of experiences and traced the possibility of error to the presence of defects in the ways of knowing. He also critically examined Buddhist subjective idealism and the theory of utter emptiness of things and proved the existence of soul as a separate entity that enjoys the results of one's actions in this or the next life.
 
 

The overall difference that emerges is that whereas Jaimini lays stress on the ritualistic parts of the Vedas, Badarayana lays stress on the philosophical portions--i.e., the Upanisads. The former recommends the path of Vedic injunctions, hence the ideal of karma; the latter recommends the path of knowledge. The central concept of Jaimini's investigation is dharma--i.e., what ought to be done; the central theme of Badarayana's investigations is Brahman--i.e., the absolute reality. The relationship between these two treatises remains a matter of controversy between later commentators--Ramanuja, a great South Indian philosopher of the 11th-12th centuries, defending the thesis that they jointly constitute a single work with Jaimini's coming first and Badarayana's coming after it in logical order, and Shankara, an earlier great South Indian philosopher of the 8th-9th centuries, in favour of the view that the two are independent of each other and possibly also inconsistent in their central theses.

Contents and organization of the four books.
Badarayana's sutras have four books (adhyayas), each book having four chapters (padas). The first book is concerned with the theme of samanvaya ("reconciliation"). The many conflicting statements of the scriptures are all said to agree in converging on one central theme: the concept of Brahman, the one absolute being from whom all beings arise, in whom they are maintained, and into whom they return. The second book establishes avirodha ("consistency") by showing the following:
(1) that dualism and Vaishesika atomism are neither sustainable interpretations of the scriptures nor defensible rationally;
(2) that though consciousness cannot conceivably arise out of a nonconscious nature, the material world could arise out of spirit;
(3) that the effect in its essence is not different from the cause;
(4) that though Brahman is all-perfect and has no want, creation is an entirely unmotivated free act of delight (lila).
The Buddhist (Vijnanavada) view that there are no external objects but only minds and their conceptions is refuted, as also the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of all that is. The Jaina pluralism and the theism of the Pashupatas and the Bhagavatas are also rejected. Because, according to Vedanta, only Brahman is external, the third and the fourth chapters of the second book undertake to show that nothing else is eternal. The third book concerns the spiritual discipline and the various stages by which the finite individual ( jiva) may realize his essential identity with Brahman. The fourth and last book deals with the final result of the modes of discipline outlined in the preceding book and distinguishes between the results achieved by worshipping a personal Godhead and those achieved by knowing the one Brahman. Included is some discussion of the possible "worlds" through which the spirits travel after death, but all this discussion is subordinate to the one dominant goal of liberation and consequent escape from the chain of rebirth.

Variations in views.
Badarayana's sutras refer to interpreters of Vedanta before him who were concerned with such central issues as the relation between the finite individual ( jiva) and the absolute spirit (Brahman) and the possible bodily existence of a liberated individual. To Ashmarthya, an early Vedanta interpreter, is ascribed the view that the finite individual and the absolute are both identical and different (as causes and their effects are different--a view that seems to have been the ancestor of the later theory of Bhedabheda). Audulomi, another pre-Badarayana Vedanta philosopher, is said to have held the view that the finite individual becomes identical with Brahman after going through a process of purification. Another interpreter, Kashakrtsna, holds that the two are identical--a view that anticipates the later "unqualified monism" of Shankara. Badarayana's own views on this issue are difficult to ascertain: the sutras are so concise that they are capable of various interpretations, though there are reasons to believe that Ramanuja’s is closer to their intentions than Shankara's.
 

The nature of the self (purusa).
According to the karikas, there are many selves, each being of the nature of pure consciousness. The self is neither the original matter (prakrti) nor an evolute of it. Though matter is composed of the three gunas (qualities), the self is not; though matter, being nonintelligent, cannot discriminate, the self is discriminating; though matter is object (visaya), the self is not; though matter is common, the self is an individual (asamanya); unlike matter, the self is not creative (aprasavadharmin). The existence of selves is proved on the ground that nature exhibits an ordered arrangement the like of which is known to be meant for another (pararthatva). 
This other must be a conscious spirit. That there are many such selves is proved on the grounds that different persons are born and die at different times, that they do not always act simultaneously, and that they show different qualities, aptitudes, and propensities. All selves are, however, passive witnesses (saksin), essentially alone (kevala), neutral (madhyastha), and not agents (akarta).

Phenomenal nature, with its distinctions of things and persons (taken as psychophysical organisms), is regarded as an evolution out of a primitive state of matter. This conception is based on a theory of causality known as the satkaryavada, according to which an effect is implicitly pre-existent in its cause prior to its production. This latter doctrine is established on the ground that if the effect were not already existent in its cause, then something would have to come out of nothing. The original prakrti (primeval stuff) is the primary matrix out of which all differentiations arose and within which they all were contained in an undistinguished manner. Original Matter is uncaused, eternal, all-pervading, one, independent, self-complete, and has no distinguishable parts; the things that emerge out of this primitive matrix are, on the other hand, caused, noneternal, limited, many, dependent, wholes composed of parts, and manifested. But Matter, whether in its original unmanifested state or in its manifested forms, is composed of three gunas, nondiscriminating (avivekin), object (visaya), general, nonconscious, and yet creative.

 The order in which Matter evolves is laid down as follows: prakrti, mahat or buddhi (Intelligence), ahamkara (ego-sense), manas (mind) five tanmatras (the sense data: colour, sound, smell, touch, and taste) five sense organs five organs of action (tongue, hands, feet, organs of evacuation and of reproduction), five gross elements (ether, air, light, water, and earth). This emanation schema may be understood either as an account of cosmic evolution or as a logical-transcendental analysis of the various factors involved in experience or as an analysis of the concrete human personality.

The concept of the three qualities (gunas).
A striking feature of this account is the conception of guna: nature is said to consist of three gunas--originally in a state of equilibrium and subsequently in varying states of mutual preponderance. The karikas do not say much about whether the gunas are to be regarded as qualities or as component elements. Of the three, harmony or tension (sattva) is light (laghu), is pleasing, and is capable of manifesting others. Activity (rajas) is dynamic, exciting, and capable of hurting. Inertia (tamas) is characterized by heaviness, conceals, is static, and causes sadness. Man's varying psychological responses are thus hypostatized and made into component properties or elements of nature--an argument whose fallacy was exposed, among others, by Shankara.

Epistemology.
The Samkhya-karika delineates three ways of knowing (pramana): perception, inference, and verbal testimony. Perception is defined as the application of the sense organs to their respective objects (prativisayadhyavasaya). Inference, which is not defined, is divided first into three kinds, and then into two. According to the former classification, an inference is called purvavat if it is based on past experience (such as when one, on seeing a dark cloud, infers that it will rain); it is called shesavat when from the presence of a certain property in one part of a thing the presence of the same property is inferred in the rest (such as when, on finding a drop of sea water to be saline, one infers the rest to be so); it is called samanyato-drsta when it is used to infer what is not perceivable (such as when one infers the movement of a star on seeing it occupy two different positions in the firmament at different times). According to the other classification, an inference may be either from the mark to that of which it is the mark or in the reverse direction. Verbal testimony, in order to be valid, must be the word of one who has authoritative knowledge.

 There is, in addition to the three ways of knowing, consideration of the modes of functioning of the sense organs. The outer senses apprehend only the present objects, the inner senses (manas, antahkarana, and buddhi) have the ability to apprehend all objects--past, present, and future. The sense organs, on apprehending their objects, are said to offer them to buddhi, or intelligence, which both makes judgments and enjoys the objects of the senses. Buddhi is also credited with the ability to perceive the distinction between the self and the natural components of the person.

Ethics.
In its ethics, the karikas manifest an intellectualism that is characteristic of the Samkhya system. Suffering is due to ignorance of the true nature of the self, and freedom, the highest good, can be reached through knowledge of the distinction between the self and nature. In this state of freedom, the self becomes indifferent to nature; it ceases to be an agent and an enjoyer. It becomes what it in fact is, a pure witness consciousness.