Now whether morality engenders satisfaction or otherwise is a contingent matter and the question arises as to what extent one can justify or refute such theories by empirical research. The difficulties are not to be underestimated. Sociology is a complex science in which the variables are extremely hard to identify, isolate and evaluate. Given the fact that moral language is in so many contexts indiscernible from the language of behavioural restriction generally, how does one identify some particular speech act such as:
'They ought to be at school'
as a statement about moral obligation as opposed to a prudential restriction or some other restriction which is a function of the physics of the situation, for example, the speed of the school bus? How does one measure the extent to which a society is a moral society? Given that elitism, authoritarianism, inequality and violent conflict can have multiple causes, how does one measure the extent to which morality was the cause? How does one accurately survey a population on the moral upbringing of their children? The matter is so laden with emotion that the answers of respondents are likely to differ markedly from their practice. The beliefs and attitudes of the researchers are bound to influence considerably the interpretation of the responses and, again, such research is itself a social interaction of a sort wherein conformity and giving a 'good' account of oneself is paramount. This is bound to disturb the variables to a considerable degree and to distort any measurement of them.
These sorts of problem are common to most research in sociology if sociology is to be thought of as the science of human interaction. Interaction involves mental attitudes, beliefs and feelings -- including beliefs about what is going on in the minds of others and what is likely to go on in their minds given certain behaviour on the part of others. As Derek Phillips has pointed out in his excellent book Knowledge from What: Theories and Methods in Social Research [1] this involves more than knowing that people have or are likely to have certain beliefs and behaviour. For to understand this behaviour, we have to experience the emotions engendering the motivations of the agents we are studying. In the case under consideration, this entails experiencing the feelings of guilt, ego deprivation, ego satisfaction and self-righteousness that the average moral agent experiences from time to time and to do this the observer has to participate in the society being studied, and further, has to be able to communicate the content of such feelings to others. This is not easy. Good autobiographical literature is useful in this area and of this there is a growing abundance. Research into moral societies requires a study of this literature by people who are willing to step back for a time from their own participation in such a society, with the object of generating an overview of the society, with a first hand experience of the moral training they have undergone.
Such a programme lies beyond the scope of this book, which is merely an account of one participant's view of the moral society. However, some of the beliefs expressed here would enjoy a modicum of scientific respectability. Sociologists seem to be largely agreed about the elitism of the moral society, and many accept that such a society is also authoritarian and inegalitarian both in power and in material rewards. Again, the early moral training of the child as explained here seems to be fairly widely accepted among psychologists and sociologists. (For references here see the notes for chapters 2 and 3.) On the other hand, there are many aspects of this description of the moral state of affairs that would be controversial and in need of further research. Nevertheless, I feel it is useful to put these views forward, not only because they seem to me to be eminently plausible, but also because they are an alternative to the conventional wisdom. We seldom feel the need to investigate a commonly held theory unless an alternative has been proposed. So I make no apologies for proposing an alternative view.
One further remark needs to be made about the standard theory that we all see the usefulness of morality (rather than just believe it to be useful). If this usefulness was so obvious, one wonders why such philosophers as Protagoras, Hobbes, Hume, Warnock and Mackie would be bothering to go to such lengths to explain these advantages to us. In the concluding chapter of his Hume's Moral Theory Mackie expressed some doubts about these advantages:
even if morality fulfils a social function, it also has side-effects some of which benefit some people at the expense of others, while others do more harm than good to almost everyone. But could we do without it? What would work, in its place? The obvious answer is, what I have called the basic practices without the moral overlay, supplemented by the social psychologist's techniques of conflict resolution. [2]
As was pointed out in the previous section, Mackie took an evolutionary approach to the explanation of our moral feelings. But sometimes evolutionary explanations in themselves explain very little. It is tautologous to say that the fittest species are the ones most likely to survive if what we mean by 'fittest' is 'most likely to survive'. Even if some god were to take a hand in deciding what survives and what does not, that god would simply become a significant ecological factor against which a particular species' fitness to survive would have to be calculated. What would be explanatory is the god's entering or failing to enter into the ecology as the case may be. Similarly, to explain the survival value of the moral society it is necessary to describe the mechanism whereby its survival value is maintained. It is essential that we understand these mechanisms, not only if we are to come to know their actual and possible consequences, but also if we are to know how to sabotage these mechanisms, should we choose to live without morality in the future.
This book is the expression of thoughts about my own experiences as a participant in a moral society. But it is more than that. If I am somewhere near correct in my depiction of that society, then my hope is that this book will encourage others to re-examine their beliefs and attitudes towards society. Perhaps more people will then share my own attitudes and beliefs regarding the moral society, and will also wish to work towards a new altruistic society in which guilt, denigration and self-deception are replaced by understanding, both of oneself and of others, and the peace, contentment and satisfaction that such understanding can bring.
[1] Phillips, Derek, Knowledge from What: Theories and Methods in Social Research, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1971.
[2] Mackie, J.L., Hume's Moral Theory, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 154-5